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Asymmetric information, strategic behavior, and discrimination in the labor market

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Author Info

  • Van Kolpin

    (Department of Economics, 1285 University of Oregon, Eugene, OR 97403-1285, USA)

  • Larry Singell Jr.

    (Department of Economics, 1285 University of Oregon, Eugene, OR 97403-1285, USA)

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    Abstract

    The neoclassical model of labor market discrimination assumes the presence of either prejudiced preferences, biased assessments of worker productivity, or monopsony power. We show that when market agents control asymmetric information, strategic behavior can induce discriminatory hiring practices even when these market features are absent. Moreover, strategic interaction many distort public policies to the point of harming the segments of the work force they were designed to support.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Springer in its journal Economic Theory.

    Volume (Year): 10 (1997)
    Issue (Month): 1 ()
    Pages: 175-184

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    Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:10:y:1997:i:1:p:175-184

    Note: Received: January 3, 1996 revised version April 29, 1996
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    Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00199/index.htm

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    Cited by:
    1. Tilman Klumpp & Xuejuan Su, 2013. "A theory of perceived discrimination," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 53(1), pages 153-180, May.
    2. Robert S. Chase, 2001. "Labor Market Discrimination During Post-Communist Transition: A Monopsony Approach to the Status of Latvia's Russian Minority," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 381, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
    3. Singell, Larry D. & Tang, Hui-Hsuan, 2013. "Pomp and circumstance: University presidents and the role of human capital in determining who leads U.S. research institutions," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 32(C), pages 219-233.
    4. Larry D. Singell & John M. McDowell & James P. Ziliak, 1999. "Cracks in the Glass Ceiling: Gender and Promotion in the Economics Profession," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(2), pages 392-396, May.
    5. Monks, James, 2000. "The returns to individual and college characteristics: Evidence from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 279-289, June.

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