Van Kolpin (Department of Economics, 1285 University of Oregon, Eugene, OR 97403-1285, USA) Larry Singell Jr. (Department of Economics, 1285 University of Oregon, Eugene, OR 97403-1285, USA)
Abstract
The neoclassical model of labor market discrimination assumes the presence of either prejudiced preferences, biased assessments of worker productivity, or monopsony power. We show that when market agents control asymmetric information, strategic behavior can induce discriminatory hiring practices even when these market features are absent. Moreover, strategic interaction many distort public policies to the point of harming the segments of the work force they were designed to support.
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Article provided by Springer in its journal Economic Theory.
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Keywords:
Find related papers by JEL classification: J71 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor Discrimination - - - Hiring and Firing D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
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