The flypaper effect and political strength
AbstractSimple models of local government behavior predict equal effects of private income and unconditional federal grants on local government expenditures. Numerous empirical analyses, however, find that the effect of grants is larger than the income effect. We argue that this flypaper effect may be a result of weak political leaderships in multi–issue and multi–party decision–making environments. In multi–issue institutions, a strong political leadership may reduce inefficiency due to interest group influence and inter–party bargaining in the local council. Utilizing data for Norwegian local governments in the 1930s, we find that political strength reduces the size of the flypaper effect. When the local council consists of only one political party, we cannot reject absence of a flypaper effect, while the flypaper effect is large in fragmented local councils. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2002
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Economics of Governance.
Volume (Year): 3 (2002)
Issue (Month): 2 (07)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/10101/index.htm
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- JEL - Labor and Demographic Economics - - - - -
- cla - - - - - -
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- H72 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Budget and Expenditures
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Lars Feld & Christoph Schaltegger, 2005.
"Voters AS A Hard Budget Constraint: On the Determination of Intergovernmental Grants,"
Springer, vol. 123(1), pages 147-169, April.
- Lars P. Feld & Christoph A. Schaltegger, 2005. "Voters as a Hard Budget Constraint: On the Determination of Intergovernmental Grants," CREMA Working Paper Series 2005-21, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA).
- Lars P. Feld & Christoph A. Schaltegger, 2004. "Voters as a hard budget constraint: On the determination of intergovernmental grants," Marburg Working Papers on Economics 200418, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
- John Ashworth & Bruno Heyndels, 2005. "Government Fragmentation And Budgetary Policy In "Good" And "Bad" Times In Flemish Municipalities," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 17, pages 245-263, 07.
- Torberg Falch & Bjarne Strøm, 2005.
"Wage Bargaining and Political Strength in the Public Sector,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
1629, CESifo Group Munich.
- Torberg Falch & Bjarne Strøm, 2003. "Wage Bargaining and Political Strength in the Public Sector," Working Paper Series 3203, Department of Economics, Norwegian University of Science and Technology.
- Ma. Guillamón & Francisco Bastida & Bernardino Benito, 2013. "The electoral budget cycle on municipal police expenditure," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 36(3), pages 447-469, December.
- Geys, Benny, 2006. "Government weakness and electoral cycles in local public debt: evidence from Flemish municipalities," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance SP II 2006-06, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
- Elena Gennari & Giovanna Messina, 2012. "How sticky are local expenditures in Italy? Assessing the relevance of the “flypaper effect” through municipal data," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 844, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Guenther Eichhorn) or (Christopher F Baum).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.