Severance Pay Rules And Structural Layoff Decisions
AbstractThe paper develops a formal model of the optimal age-tenure structure in layoff decisions. Based on a linear Bayesian learning process a severance pay rule, which is derived from voluntary participation and separation conditions for individual workers, determines the dismissal costs. An optimal selection policy generally equalizes the expected profit contributions over the marginal workers retained in each age-group. Given plausible assumptions, the selection criteria and layoff rates for older workers decrease. However, the effect of tenure on selection and layoff rates remains ambiguous.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by LMU Munich School of Management in its journal Schmalenbach Business Review.
Volume (Year): 54 (2002)
Issue (Month): 2 (April)
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- J65 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings
- J21 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Labor Force and Employment, Size, and Structure
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Christian Grund, 2004. "Severance Payments for Dismissed Employees Severance Payments for Dismissed Employees in Germany," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse4_2004, University of Bonn, Germany.
- repec:iza:izadps:dp875 is not listed on IDEAS
- Christian Grund, 2006. "Severance payments for dismissed employees in Germany," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 22(1), pages 49-71, July.
- Christian Grund, 2006. "Overcompensation by severance payments," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 38(8), pages 925-930.
- Oliver Fabel & Martin Kolmar, 2007. "On 'Golden Parachutes' as Manager Discipline," TWI Research Paper Series 17, Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut, Universität Konstanz.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (sbr).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.