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Don’t hatch the messenger? On the desirability of restricting the political activity of bureaucrats

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  • Jean Guillaume Forand

    (Department of Economics, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, ON, Canada)

  • Gergely Ujhelyi

Abstract

Many countries place restrictions on the political rights of government workers. This includes limitations on political activities such as taking an active part in political campaigns. Are such restrictions desirable? We present a formal welfare analysis of this question. Bureaucrats’ political activities affect voter perceptions of the government and this can have informational benefits. However, they can also induce policy mistakes and are susceptible to ‘noise’ from some bureaucrats’ innate desire for political expression. When politicians have limited control over bureaucrats and successfully coordinate with voters, bureaucrats’ political activities can be desirable. In most cases, however, banning political activities is optimal.

Suggested Citation

  • Jean Guillaume Forand & Gergely Ujhelyi, 2021. "Don’t hatch the messenger? On the desirability of restricting the political activity of bureaucrats," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 33(1), pages 95-139, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:33:y:2021:i:1:p:95-139
    DOI: 10.1177/0951629820984848
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    References listed on IDEAS

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