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Propaganda and Protest in Autocracies

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  • Erin Baggott Carter
  • Brett L. Carter

Abstract

Does propaganda reduce the rate of popular protest in autocracies? To answer this question, we draw on an original dataset of state-run newspapers from thirty countries, encompassing six languages and over four million articles. We find that propaganda diminishes the rate of protest, and that its effects persist over time. By increasing the level of pro-regime propaganda by one standard deviation, autocrats have reduced the odds of protest the following day by 15%. The half-life of this effect is between five and ten days, and very little of the initial effect persists after one month. This temporal persistence is remarkably consistent with campaign advertisements in democracies.

Suggested Citation

  • Erin Baggott Carter & Brett L. Carter, 2021. "Propaganda and Protest in Autocracies," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 65(5), pages 919-949, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:sae:jocore:v:65:y:2021:i:5:p:919-949
    DOI: 10.1177/0022002720975090
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    References listed on IDEAS

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