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The Political Costs of Abusing Human Rights: International Cooperation in Extraordinary Rendition

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  • Rebecca Cordell

Abstract

From 2001 to 2005, over a quarter of all countries in the world cooperated in a secret rendition network that enabled the transfer of CIA terrorist suspects to secret detention sites. While governments in some states have not been punished for participating, others have incurred political costs, including electoral defeats. What explains variation in the political costs of participation in the post-9/11 extraordinary rendition program? I argue that left of center governments, particularly those in democracies, suffered greater political costs from being caught because of the perception that they are better at protecting civil liberties in the name of national security. I test the effect of party orientation on electoral defeat at the election following the revelation of participation in extraordinary rendition using a matched sample where the party in office at the time of participation remained the same. The analysis provides empirical support for my theoretical argument.

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  • Rebecca Cordell, 2021. "The Political Costs of Abusing Human Rights: International Cooperation in Extraordinary Rendition," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 65(2-3), pages 255-282, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jocore:v:65:y:2021:i:2-3:p:255-282
    DOI: 10.1177/0022002720967434
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    References listed on IDEAS

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