IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/sae/jocore/v63y2019i3p672-699.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

External Supporters and Negotiated Settlement: Political Bargaining in Solving Governmental Incompatibility

Author

Listed:
  • Wakako Maekawa

Abstract

External supporters have heterogeneous preferences over civil war outcomes depending on the issues at stake. In this article, the bargaining model and empirical study show that such preferences of external supporters need to be considered not only when analyzing the causes of support but also when analyzing how they affect a conflict. By adding an external supporter to a traditional conflict bargaining model as a strategic actor who receives a payoff from the political division, this article investigates how the preferences of external supporters influence the likelihood of a peace agreement in civil wars over a government. I demonstrate that a peace agreement is more likely to happen when the external supporters of the government side are not satisfied with the current political status quo of the supported state. The empirical analysis of political civil wars from 1976 to 2009 supports the implications of the bargaining model.

Suggested Citation

  • Wakako Maekawa, 2019. "External Supporters and Negotiated Settlement: Political Bargaining in Solving Governmental Incompatibility," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 63(3), pages 672-699, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jocore:v:63:y:2019:i:3:p:672-699
    DOI: 10.1177/0022002717751202
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0022002717751202
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1177/0022002717751202?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Saideman, Stephen M., 1997. "Explaining the International Relations of Secessionist Conflicts: Vulnerability Versus Ethnic Ties," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 51(4), pages 721-753, October.
    2. McGillivray, Fiona & Smith, Alastair, 2004. "The Impact of Leadership Turnover on Trading Relations Between States," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 58(3), pages 567-600, July.
    3. Destradi, Sandra, 2010. "A Regional Power Promoting Democracy? India's Involvement in Nepal (2005-2008)," GIGA Working Papers 138, GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies.
    4. James D. Fearon, 2004. "Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer than Others?," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 41(3), pages 275-301, May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Gary Uzonyi & Matthew Wells, 2016. "Domestic institutions, leader tenure and the duration of civil war," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 33(3), pages 294-310, July.
    2. Michael G. Findley & Josiah F. Marineau, 2015. "Lootable resources and third-party intervention into civil wars," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 32(5), pages 465-486, November.
    3. Enze Han & Joseph O’Mahoney & Christopher Paik, 2014. "External kin, economic disparity and minority ethnic group mobilization," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 31(1), pages 49-69, February.
    4. Maxime Menuet & Petros G. Sekeris, 2021. "Overconfidence and conflict," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 59(4), pages 1483-1499, October.
    5. Jørgen Juel Andersen & Frode Martin Nordvik & Andrea Tesei, 2022. "Oil Price Shocks and Conflict Escalation: Onshore versus Offshore," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 66(2), pages 327-356, February.
    6. Katherine Sawyer & Kathleen Gallagher Cunningham & William Reed, 2017. "The Role of External Support in Civil War Termination," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 61(6), pages 1174-1202, July.
    7. Ola Olsson & Heather Congdon Fors, 2004. "Congo: The Prize of Predation," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 41(3), pages 321-336, May.
    8. Tilman Br�ck & Patricia Justino & Philip Verwimp & Andrew Tedesco & Alexandra Avdeenko, 2013. "Measuring Conflict Exposure in Micro-Level Surveys," HiCN Working Papers 153, Households in Conflict Network.
    9. Stefan Wolff & Simona Ross & Asbjorn Wee, 2020. "Subnational Governance and Conflict," World Bank Publications - Reports 34436, The World Bank Group.
    10. Magnus Lundgren, 2017. "Which type of international organizations can settle civil wars?," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 12(4), pages 613-641, December.
    11. Flores Thomas Edward, 2014. "Vertical Inequality, Land Reform, and Insurgency in Colombia," Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 20(1), pages 5-31, January.
    12. Joshua D. Angrist & Adriana D. Kugler, 2008. "Rural Windfall or a New Resource Curse? Coca, Income, and Civil Conflict in Colombia," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 90(2), pages 191-215, May.
    13. Stelios Michalopoulos & Elias Papaioannou, 2016. "The Long-Run Effects of the Scramble for Africa," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 106(7), pages 1802-1848, July.
    14. Daniel Berger & William Easterly & Nathan Nunn & Shanker Satyanath, 2013. "Commercial Imperialism? Political Influence and Trade during the Cold War," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 103(2), pages 863-896, April.
    15. Thiemo Fetzer & Pedro C. L. Souza & Oliver Vanden Eynde & Austin L. Wright, 2021. "Security Transitions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 111(7), pages 2275-2308, July.
    16. Eduardo Borensztein & Ugo Panizza, 2009. "The Costs of Sovereign Default," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 56(4), pages 683-741, November.
    17. Anesi, Vincent, 2012. "Secessionism and minority protection in an uncertain world," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(1), pages 53-61.
    18. Anesi, Vincent, 2012. "Secessionism and minority protection in an uncertain world," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(1), pages 53-61.
    19. Mansoob Murshed, 2006. "Indivisibility, Fairness, Farsightedness and their Implications for Security," WIDER Working Paper Series RP2006-28, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    20. Fuchs, Andreas, 2016. "China’s Economic Diplomacy and the Politics-Trade Nexus," Working Papers 0609, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:sae:jocore:v:63:y:2019:i:3:p:672-699. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: SAGE Publications (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://pss.la.psu.edu/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.