IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/sae/jocore/v45y2001i2p147-173.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

When Does Aerial Bombing Work?

Author

Listed:
  • Michael Horowitz

    (Center for Strategic and International Studies)

  • Dan Reiter

    (Political Science Department, Emory University)

Abstract

Coercion through air power has been and continues to be an important tool of foreign policy. Multivariate probit analysis is used to test three hypotheses on all instances of air power coercion from 1917 to 1999: (1) air power coercion attempts are more likely to work if they exploit military rather than civilian vulnerabilities, (2) the regime type of the target affects the chances of success, and (3) success is less likely if the attacker demands that the target change its leadership. Results show that coercion is more likely to work if the target's military vulnerability is higher, but higher levels of civilian vulnerability have no effect on the chances of coercion success; that target regime type has no effect; and that success is less likely when the attacker demands the target change its leadership.

Suggested Citation

  • Michael Horowitz & Dan Reiter, 2001. "When Does Aerial Bombing Work?," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 45(2), pages 147-173, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:sae:jocore:v:45:y:2001:i:2:p:147-173
    DOI: 10.1177/0022002701045002001
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0022002701045002001
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1177/0022002701045002001?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Dan Reiter & Allan C. Stam III, 1998. "Democracy and Battlefield Military Effectiveness," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 42(3), pages 259-277, June.
    2. Scott D. Bennett & Allan C. Stam III, 1998. "The Declining Advantages of Democracy," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 42(3), pages 344-366, June.
    3. Gary Clyde Hufbauer & Jeffrey J. Schott & Kimberly Ann Elliott, 2009. "Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, 3rd Edition (paper)," Peterson Institute Press: All Books, Peterson Institute for International Economics, number 4129, October.
    4. Gary Clyde Hufbauer & Jeffrey J. Schott & Kimberly Ann Elliott, 1990. "Economic Sanctions Reconsidered: 2nd Edition," Peterson Institute Press: All Books, Peterson Institute for International Economics, number 82, January.
    5. de Mesquita, Bruce Bueno & Siverson, Randolph M., 1995. "War and the Survival of Political Leaders: A Comparative Study of Regime Types and Political Accountability," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 89(4), pages 841-855, December.
    6. de Mesquita, Bruce Bueno & Morrow, James D. & Siverson, Randolph M. & Smith, Alastair, 1999. "An Institutional Explanation of the Democratic Peace," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 93(4), pages 791-807, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Carla Martinez Machain, 2015. "Air Campaign Duration and the Interaction of Air and Ground Forces," International Interactions, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 41(3), pages 539-564, May.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Nakao, Keisuke, 2022. "Democratic Victory and War Duration: Why Are Democracies Less Likely to Win Long Wars?," MPRA Paper 112849, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Christopher Gelpi & Joseph M. Grieco, 2001. "Attracting Trouble," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 45(6), pages 794-817, December.
    3. William Reed & David H. Clark, 2000. "War Initiators and War Winners," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 44(3), pages 378-395, June.
    4. Susan Hannah Allen, 2007. "Time Bombs," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 51(1), pages 112-133, February.
    5. Chojnacki, Sven, 2003. "Demokratien und Krieg: Das Konfliktverhalten demokratischer Staaten im internationalen System, 1946-2001," Discussion Papers, Research Group International Politics P 03-304, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
    6. Scott Sigmund Gartner & Gary M. Segura, 1998. "War, Casualties, and Public Opinion," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 42(3), pages 278-300, June.
    7. Scott Sigmund Gartner, 1998. "Opening Up the Black Box of War," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 42(3), pages 252-258, June.
    8. Christopher Gelpi, 2017. "Democracies in Conflict," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 61(9), pages 1925-1949, October.
    9. Kenneth A. Schultz, 2001. "Looking for Audience Costs," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 45(1), pages 32-60, February.
    10. H. E. Goemans, 2000. "Fighting for Survival," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 44(5), pages 555-579, October.
    11. Mark Harrison & Nikolaus Wolf, 2014. "The Frequency of Wars," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: THE ECONOMICS OF COERCION AND CONFLICT, chapter 5, pages 121-149, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    12. Kimberly Ann Elliott, 2003. "Economic Leverage and the North Korean Nuclear Crisis," Policy Briefs PB03-03, Peterson Institute for International Economics.
    13. Daniel Berger & William Easterly & Nathan Nunn & Shanker Satyanath, 2013. "Commercial Imperialism? Political Influence and Trade during the Cold War," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 103(2), pages 863-896, April.
    14. Ralph, Lauren, 2019. "In Consideration of Economic Sanctions," Studies in Applied Economics 131, The Johns Hopkins Institute for Applied Economics, Global Health, and the Study of Business Enterprise.
    15. O'Rourke, Kevin, 2005. "The Worldwide Economic Impact of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars," CEPR Discussion Papers 5079, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    16. Carlo de Bassa Scheresberg, Francesco Passarelli, 2011. "Strategic Sovereign Defaults under International Sanctions," ISLA Working Papers 42, ISLA, Centre for research on Latin American Studies and Transition Economies, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    17. Inman, Robert P. & Rubinfeld, Daniel L., 2012. "Understanding the Democratic Transition in South Africa," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series qt4mp5t4ff, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics.
    18. Cooper, Richard, 2004. "Is "Economic Power" a Useful and Operational Concept?," Scholarly Articles 3677050, Harvard University Department of Economics.
    19. Philippe Martin & Thierry Mayer & Mathias Thoenig, 2008. "Make Trade Not War?," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 75(3), pages 865-900.
    20. Busse, Matthias & Braun, Sebastian, 2004. "Export Structure, FDI and Child Labour," Journal of Economic Integration, Center for Economic Integration, Sejong University, vol. 19, pages 804-829.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:sae:jocore:v:45:y:2001:i:2:p:147-173. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: SAGE Publications (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://pss.la.psu.edu/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.