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Open Questions in Defense Economics and Economic Warfare

Author

Listed:
  • Martin Shubik

    (Yale University)

  • J. Hoult Verkerke

Abstract

A distinction is made concerning five distinct war scenarios, and a discussion is given of the different economic requirements for each of these scenarios. These requirements pose a considerable number of new economic problems that were not present in defense economics prior to World War II.

Suggested Citation

  • Martin Shubik & J. Hoult Verkerke, 1989. "Open Questions in Defense Economics and Economic Warfare," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 33(3), pages 480-499, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jocore:v:33:y:1989:i:3:p:480-499
    DOI: 10.1177/0022002789033003006
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Zvi A. Livne & Martin Shubik, 1982. "Naval Procurement Problems: Theory and Practice," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 627, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    2. Ash, J Colin K & Udis, Bernard & McNown, Robert F, 1983. "Enlistments in the All-Volunteer Force: A Military Personnel Supply Model and Its Forecasts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(1), pages 145-155, March.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Martin Shubik, 2018. "The Paradox of Competition: Power, Markets, and Money - Who Gets What, When, How"," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2118R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    2. Martin Shubik, 2018. "Who Gets What, When, How" Power, Organization, Markets, Money and the Allocation of Resources," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2118, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    3. Parchomovsky, Gideon & Siegelman, Peter, 2009. "Bribes vs. bombs: A study in Coasean warfare," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(3), pages 179-190, September.

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