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Group Size and Others' Strategy in an N-Person Game

Author

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  • John Fox

    (Department of Sociology York University)

  • Melvin Guyer

    (Mental Health Research Institute University of Michigan)

Abstract

The effects of group size and cooperativeness of others upon an individual's propensity to cooperate is studied using the Take-Some format of the Prisoner's Dilemma game. By holding utility effects constant, this format permits comparisons to be made between the performances of subjects in different size groups. A 2 × 2 experimental design was employed in which 48 male subjects were assigned to stooge-player groups comprised of either two or eleven “others.†Stooge players in these groups employed either high or low cooperative strategies in 200 repeated trials of play. The results show a significant group-size effect upon the degree of cooperativeness evidenced by the subjects. A significant group size x stooge strategy interaction was also observed, subjects in the 3-person group being responsive to the “others†while subjects in the larger group remained relatively unaffected by “others' †cooperativeness. An interpretation of these results is made in terms of the “accountability†of an individual to others in the group.

Suggested Citation

  • John Fox & Melvin Guyer, 1977. "Group Size and Others' Strategy in an N-Person Game," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 21(2), pages 323-338, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jocore:v:21:y:1977:i:2:p:323-338
    DOI: 10.1177/002200277702100206
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. V. Edwin Bixenstine & Clifford A. Levitt & Kellogg V. Wilson, 1966. "Collaboration among six persons in a Prisoner's Dilemma game," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 10(4), pages 488-496, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Kamei, Kenju, 2020. "Group size effect and over-punishment in the case of third party enforcement of social norms," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 175(C), pages 395-412.
    2. Jager, W. & Janssen, M. A. & De Vries, H. J. M. & De Greef, J. & Vlek, C. A. J., 2000. "Behaviour in commons dilemmas: Homo economicus and Homo psychologicus in an ecological-economic model," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(3), pages 357-379, December.

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