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Political Dynasticism: Networks, Trust, Risk

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  • Arild Engelsen Ruud
  • Kenneth Bo Nielsen

Abstract

Political dynasticism is a persuasive phenomenon in South Asia. Yet, while political dynasticism has received ample attention at the national level, it has been almost systematically overlooked at the regional and local levels. In this article, we argue that political dynasticism at the local level is driven by conditions that are in crucial ways different from those that animate national politics. We use case studies and insights from the available literature both within and beyond South Asia to argue that, in a comparative light, three main elements stand out: reciprocity, trust, and failure. By zooming in on these elements we seek to explain political dynasticism as a political phenomenon that is enabled by particular conditions in the polity, and especially the nature of the state. These, we argue, help foment a dynamic within which political dynasticism is an understandable outcome.

Suggested Citation

  • Arild Engelsen Ruud & Kenneth Bo Nielsen, 2018. "Political Dynasticism: Networks, Trust, Risk," Studies in Indian Politics, , vol. 6(2), pages 157-167, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:sae:indpol:v:6:y:2018:i:2:p:157-167
    DOI: 10.1177/2321023018797407
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    References listed on IDEAS

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