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Is the Bureaucrat the Main Responsible for Corruption?

Author

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  • Gerasimos T. Soldatos

    (American University of Athens, Athens, Greece)

Abstract

The combination of a simple game-theoretic interaction between two firms bidding for a public project and the possibility of moral hazard on the part of the public official who is in charge of this project results in the proposition that there cannot be corruption unless the public official signals so. The result is lower quantity and quality of the goods and services offered through public projects. The combination of a simple game-theoretic interaction between two firms bidding for a public project and the possibility of moral hazard on the part of the public official who is in charge of this project results in the proposition that there cannot be corruption unless the public official signals so. The result is lower quantity and quality of the goods and services offered through public projects

Suggested Citation

  • Gerasimos T. Soldatos, 2016. "Is the Bureaucrat the Main Responsible for Corruption?," Review of Applied Socio-Economic Research, Pro Global Science Association, vol. 12(2), pages 12-18, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:rse:wpaper:v:12:y:2016:i:2:p:12-18
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Campos, Nauro & Saleh, Ahmad & Dimova, Ralitza, 2010. "Whither Corruption? A Quantitative Survey of the Literature on Corruption and Growth," CEPR Discussion Papers 8140, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Petter Gottschalk & Christy Smith, 2016. "Detection of white-collar corruption in public procurement in Norway: the role of whistleblowers," International Journal of Procurement Management, Inderscience Enterprises Ltd, vol. 9(4), pages 427-443.
    3. Asim Ijaz Khwaja & Atif Mian, 2005. "Do Lenders Favor Politically Connected Firms? Rent Provision in an Emerging Financial Market," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 120(4), pages 1371-1411.
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    Cited by:

    1. Erotokritos Varelas, 2017. "Is bank lending corruption self-regulatory?," Journal of Economic and Financial Studies (JEFS), LAR Center Press, vol. 5(3), pages 31-34, June.
    2. Erotokritos Varelas, 2017. "Is bank lending corruption self-regulatory? A note," Discussion Paper Series 2017_03, Department of Economics, University of Macedonia, revised Mar 2017.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    public project; moral hazard; public official corruption;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • H57 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Procurement
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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