We develop a model that incorporates salient features of the Seattle Fur Exchange: identical lots of furs are auctioned sequentially, bids must be raised by specified increments, and the winner of a lot has the privilege of beginning the bidding on the subsequent lot. Predictions of the theory are consistent with the data. Revenue implications of the theory are also explored. Ordering information: This article can be ordered from http://gemini.econ.umd.edu/cgi-bin/rje_online.cgi?action=view&year=2006&issue=spr&page=70.
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Volume (Year): 37 (2006) Issue (Month): 1 (Spring) Pages: 70-80 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
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