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Sales Maximation and Specific Human Capital

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Author Info
Jan Zabojnik

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Abstract

Profit-maximizing owners of firms may find it optimal to provide managers with incentives to maximize sales in addition to profits. This influences the outcome of the bargaining game between workers and managers over workers' wages and helps to solve the problem of underinvestment by workers in specific human capital. Iinvestigate optimal managerial contracts from this point of view and show that the optimal contract is a function of sales in addition to profits.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by The RAND Corporation in its journal RAND Journal of Economics.

Volume (Year): 29 (1998)
Issue (Month): 4 (Winter)
Pages: 790-802
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Handle: RePEc:rje:randje:v:29:y:1998:i:winter:p:790-802

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  1. Dan Bernhardt & Steeve Mongrain, 2007. "The Layoff Rat Race," Discussion Papers dp07-06, Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University. [Downloadable!]
  2. L. Lambertini & G. Primavera, 2000. "Delegation vs Cost-Reducing R&D in a Cournot Duopoly," Working Papers 377, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Università di Bologna. [Downloadable!]
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