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What Occupational Safety Tells Us about Political Power in Union Firms

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  • Shulamit Kahn

Abstract

This article tests hypotheses on the distribution of power within unionized firms by measuring which workers' preferences determine the level of firm-supplied occupational safety. An egalitarian model in which all workers have equal impact can be easily rejected, as can a median-worker model. The dominant groups appear to be the most senior workers with more than ten years of seniority and recently hired workers with three or fewer years of seniority. This suggests that unions pursue the objectives of the most senior workers while management tries to set a safety level that is attractive to the more mobile workers.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by The RAND Corporation in its journal RAND Journal of Economics.

Volume (Year): 21 (1990)
Issue (Month): 3 (Autumn)
Pages: 481-496

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Handle: RePEc:rje:randje:v:21:y:1990:i:autumn:p:481-496

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Cited by:
  1. Thomas C. Buchmueller & John DiNardo & Robert G. Valletta, 2000. "Union effects on health insurance provision and coverage in the United States," Working Paper Series, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco 2000-04, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
  2. Alejandro Donado & Klaus Wälde, 2011. "How Trade Unions Increase Welfare," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo Group Munich 3618, CESifo Group Munich.

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