What Occupational Safety Tells Us about Political Power in Union Firms
AbstractThis article tests hypotheses on the distribution of power within unionized firms by measuring which workers' preferences determine the level of firm-supplied occupational safety. An egalitarian model in which all workers have equal impact can be easily rejected, as can a median-worker model. The dominant groups appear to be the most senior workers with more than ten years of seniority and recently hired workers with three or fewer years of seniority. This suggests that unions pursue the objectives of the most senior workers while management tries to set a safety level that is attractive to the more mobile workers.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by The RAND Corporation in its journal RAND Journal of Economics.
Volume (Year): 21 (1990)
Issue (Month): 3 (Autumn)
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Web page: http://www.rje.org
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- Thomas C. Buchmueller & John DiNardo & Robert G. Valletta, 2000. "Union effects on health insurance provision and coverage in the United States," Working Papers in Applied Economic Theory 2000-04, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
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