This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Competition within the Firm: Theory Plus Some Evidence from Medical Group Practice

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Martin Gaynor

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

Recent work on the economics of the firm and other organizations has emphasized the importance of internal organization and incentives. The issue of competition within the firm has not arisen, however. In this article I construct a model of nonprice competition among members of a professional partnership and test the model with data on medical group practice. The empirical results are consistent with the hypothesis of nonprice competition among members of the firm.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0741-6261%28198921%2920%3A1%3C59%3ACWTFTP%3E2.0.CO%3B2-Q&origin=repec
File Format: application/pdf
File Function: full text
Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to JSTOR subscribers. See http://www.jstor.org for details.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Publisher Info
Article provided by The RAND Corporation in its journal RAND Journal of Economics.

Volume (Year): 20 (1989)
Issue (Month): 1 (Spring)
Pages: 59-76
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:rje:randje:v:20:y:1989:i:spring:p:59-76

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.rje.org

Order Information:
Web: http://gemini.econ.umd.edu/cgi-bin/rje_online.cgi

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: ().

Related research
Keywords:

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Martin Gaynor, 1995. "Issues in the Industrial Organization of the Market for Physician Services," NBER Working Papers 4695, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Robert Rosenman & Daniel Friesner, 2004. "Scope and scale inefficiencies in physician practices," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 13(11), pages 1091-1116. [Downloadable!]
  3. W. Bradford & Robert Martin, 2000. "Partnerships, Profit Sharing, and Quality Competition in the Medical Profession," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, vol. 17(2), pages 193-208, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. William E. Encinosa III & Martin Gaynor & James B. Rebitzer, 1997. "The Sociology of Groups and the Economics of Incentives: Theory and Evidence on Compensation Systems," NBER Working Papers 5953, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? All top Economics journals are listed on RePEc.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-13.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.