Partnerships, Profit Sharing, and Quality Competition in the Medical Profession
AbstractNo abstract is available for this item.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Review of Industrial Organization.
Volume (Year): 17 (2000)
Issue (Month): 2 (September)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100336
Internal contracting; partnerships; physician firms; quality;
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Hart, Oliver, 1995. "Corporate Governance: Some Theory and Implications," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 105(430), pages 678-89, May.
- Gaynor, Martin & Pauly, Mark V, 1990. "Compensation and Productive Efficiency of Partnerships: Evidence from Medical Group Practice," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(3), pages 544-73, June.
- Getzen, Thomas E, 1984. "A "Brand Name Firm" Theory of Medical Group Practice," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 33(2), pages 199-215, December.
- Lee, Robert H., 1990. "Monitoring physicians : A bargaining model of medical group practice," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 9(4), pages 463-481, December.
- Bengt Holmstrom, 1981.
"Moral Hazard in Teams,"
471, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Radner, Roy, 1986. "Repeated Partnership Games with Imperfect Monitoring and No Discounting," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(1), pages 43-57, January.
- Joseph Farrell and Suzanne Scotchmer., 1986.
Economics Working Papers
8616, University of California at Berkeley.
- Bradford, W David & Martin, Robert E, 1995. "Office Triage and the Physician's Supply Curve," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 20(2), pages 303-23.
- Leibowitz, Arleen & Tollison, Robert, 1980. "Free Riding, Shirking, and Team Production in Legal Partnerships," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 18(3), pages 380-94, July.
- Hugh Gravelle & Anthony Scott & Peter Sivey & Jongsay Yong, 2013.
"Competition, prices, and quality in the market for physician consultations,"
089cherp, Centre for Health Economics, University of York.
- Hugh Gravelle & Anthony Scott & Peter Sivey & Jongsay Yong, 2013. "Competition, Prices and Quality in the Market for Physician Consultations," Melbourne Institute Working Paper Series wp2013n23, Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research, The University of Melbourne.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Guenther Eichhorn) or (Christopher F. Baum).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.