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On Share Contracts and Screening

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Author Info
Franklin Allen

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Abstract

It has been suggested by Hallagan (1978) and Newbery and Stiglitz (1979) that the coexistence of rent, wage, and share contracts generates information on the abilities of tenants which allows landlords to allocate resources more efficiently. It is argued here that despite the asymmetric information in their models, it is possible to achieve an efficient allocation of resources without the use of share contracts, by having tenants organize production. An alternative model is then given where efficiency cannot be achieved in this way because the quality of land as well as the ability of tenants is unobservable. In this case the use of sets of wage and share contracts may lead to an efficient outcome.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by The RAND Corporation in its journal Bell Journal of Economics.

Volume (Year): 13 (1982)
Issue (Month): 2 (Autumn)
Pages: 541-547
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Handle: RePEc:rje:bellje:v:13:y:1982:i:autumn:p:541-547

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  1. Sanjaya DeSilva, 2000. "Skills, Partnerships and Tenancy in Sri Lankan Rice Farms," Working Papers 819, Economic Growth Center, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Sen, Debapriya, 2009. "A theory of sharecropping: the role of price behavior and imperfect competition," MPRA Paper 14898, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  3. Ananish Chaudhuri & Pushkar Maitra, 2001. "Tenant characteristics and the choice of tenurial contracts in rural India," Journal of International Development, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 13(2), pages 169-181. [Downloadable!]
  4. Affuso, L., 2000. "Intra-Firm Retail Contracting: Survey Evidence from the UK'," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0022, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge. [Downloadable!]
  5. Rizov, Marian, 2002. "Agricultural Production Organization in Transition Economies and the Role of Human Capital: Evidence from Romania," 2002 International Congress, August 28-31, 2002, Zaragoza, Spain 24925, European Association of Agricultural Economists. [Downloadable!]
  6. Juliano Junqueira Assunção & Humberto Moreira, 2005. "Land taxes in a Latin American context," Textos para discussão 497, Department of Economics PUC-Rio (Brazil). [Downloadable!]
  7. Assuncao, Juliano, 2006. "Land Reform and Landholdings in Brazil," Working Papers RP2006/137, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER). [Downloadable!]
  8. Juliano Junqueira Assunção, 2005. "Non-agricultural land use and land reform: theory and evidence from Brazil," Textos para discussão 496, Department of Economics PUC-Rio (Brazil). [Downloadable!]
  9. Ananish Chaudhuri & Pushkar Maitra, 1997. "Determinants of Land Tenure Contracts; Theory and Evidence from Rural India," Departmental Working Papers 199710, Rutgers University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  10. Rizov, Marian, 2003. "Human Capital And The Agrarian Structure In Transition: Micro Evidence From Romania," 2003 Annual Meeting, August 16-22, 2003, Durban, South Africa 25823, International Association of Agricultural Economists. [Downloadable!]
  11. Ananish Chaudhuri, 1997. "A Dynamic Model of Contractual Choice in Tenancy," Departmental Working Papers 199711, Rutgers University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  12. Eugene Canjels & Ute Volz, 2001. "Share Contracts and Unobserved Ability," SCEPA Working Papers 2001-03, Schwartz Center for Economic Policy Analysis (SCEPA), The New School. [Downloadable!]
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