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Defense As A Private Good In A Competitive Order

Author

Listed:
  • Jakub Bożydar Wiśniewski

    (King's College, London)

Abstract

In this paper, I attempt to provide a comprehensive demonstration that,contrary to popular opinion, there is nothing inherent in defense that makes it belong to the category of common goods, thus indicating that its effective provision does not require the existence of a territorial monopoly of force, and could be satisfactorily delivered in a purely market­based system. The above analysis implies that within a contractual, competitive, and purely voluntary social order this task could be accomplished even with respect to protection goods that affect wide geographical areas, while avoiding the problem of agency infighting.

Suggested Citation

  • Jakub Bożydar Wiśniewski, 2014. "Defense As A Private Good In A Competitive Order," Review of Social and Economic Issues, Romanian-American University, vol. 1(1), pages 3-35, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:rau:rseijr:v:1:y:2014:i:1:p:3-35
    as

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    File URL: http://www.rebe.rau.ro/RePEc/rau/rseijr/SU14/RSEI-SU14-A1.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Benson, Bruce L, 1993. "The Impetus for Recognizing Private Property and Adopting Ethical Behavior in a Market Economy: Natural Law, Government Law, or Evolving Self-Interest," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer;Society for the Development of Austrian Economics, vol. 6(2), pages 43-80.
    2. Stringham, Edward, 2003. "The extralegal development of securities trading in seventeenth-century Amsterdam," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 43(2), pages 321-344.
    3. Walter Block & William Barnett, 2009. "Coase and Bertrand on lighthouses," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 140(1), pages 1-13, July.
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