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Les infrastructures de transport et la logique financière du partenariat public-privé : quelques paradoxes

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  • Alain Bonnafous

Abstract

[eng] The opportunity of private financing, building and operating of new infrastructure projects is more and more frequently explored by public authorities in the world. This trend is justified by various reasons. This paper concerns one of them which is a lower need of public financing and more specifically some questions: what is the consequence on public financing of a weak profitability rate of the project according to a public or private operator? is the "private going" only relevant with high profitability rates? One of the answers to these questions is what we call the paradox of profitability rate which can be formulated as following: the internal rate of return being supposed the same in the public and the private case, the need of subsidies for a non self-financed project is higher with a private operator than with a public one, but the additional cost of the private issue is decreasing when the profitability rate of the project is itself decreasing. This article proposes a general demonstration of this paradox and its policy oriented implications, inclu- ding in the case of a better efficiency of the private operator. [fre] L'implication d'opérateurs privés dans le financement, la construction et l'exploitation d'infrastructures publiques sont de plus en plus fréquemment explorées par la puissance publique. Cette tendance a ses raisons, dont le souci de minimiser la dépense publique qui est souvent évoqué. Mais quelles sont les conséquences d'une faible rentabilité financière du projet sur le choix entre opé- rateur public ou privé ? Le choix du privé n'est-il pertinent que lorsque cette rentabilité est forte ? La réponse à ces questions tient, en particulier, à un paradoxe de la rentabilité financière : en supposant que les opérateurs publics et privés aient la même efficience, tout projet qui ne peut être autofinancé requiert plus de subvention si le privé est choisi, mais le surcoût correspondant pour les finances publiques est d'autant plus faible que la rentabilité du projet est elle-même faible. Cet article propose une démonstration de ce paradoxe et en décline quelques conséquences, y compris en cas de meilleure efficience de la part de l'opérateur privé.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Programme National Persée in its journal Revue française d'économie.

Volume (Year): 17 (2002)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 173-194

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Handle: RePEc:prs:rfreco:rfeco_0769-0479_2002_num_17_1_1458

Note: DOI:10.3406/rfeco.2002.1458
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Web page: http://www.persee.fr/web/revues/home/prescript/revue/rfeco

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Cited by:
  1. William Roy, 2005. "Évaluation des programmes d'infrastructure : ordre optimal de réalisation sous contrainte financière," Post-Print halshs-00003971, HAL.
  2. Alain Bonnafous, 2010. "Programming, optimal pricing and partnership contract for infrastructures in PPPs," Post-Print halshs-00578246, HAL.
  3. Damien Broussolle, 2011. "Le Peage Urbain : Une Source De Financement Acceptable ? Avec Une Application Au Cas De L’Agglomeration Strasbourgeoise," Working Papers of LaRGE Research Center, Laboratoire de Recherche en Gestion et Economie (LaRGE), Université de Strasbourg 2011-07, Laboratoire de Recherche en Gestion et Economie (LaRGE), Université de Strasbourg.
  4. Anastasios Michailidis & Efstratios Loizou & Georgios Theodosiou, 2006. "Socioeconomic Evaluation and Ranking of Infrastructure Projects," ERSA conference papers ersa06p395, European Regional Science Association.
  5. William Roy & Pablo Jensen & Alain Bonnafous, 2006. "Le cofinancement usager-contribuable et le partenariat public-privé changent les termes de l'évaluation des programmes d'investissement public," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, Programme National Persée, vol. 175(4), pages 15-30.
  6. Bonnafous, Alain & Jensen, Pablo, 2005. "Ranking transport projects by their socioeconomic value or financial internal rate of return?," Transport Policy, Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 131-136, March.
  7. William Roy, 2004. "L'investissement public dans les infrastructures de transport est-il source de croissance endogène ?," Post-Print halshs-00103274, HAL.
  8. Bonnafous, Alain, 2012. "The use of PPP's and the profitability rate paradox," Research in Transportation Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 36(1), pages 45-49.

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