IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/plo/pone00/0018545.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Non-Disruptive Tactics of Suppression Are Superior in Countering Terrorism, Insurgency, and Financial Panics

Author

Listed:
  • David A Siegel

Abstract

Background: Suppressing damaging aggregate behaviors such as insurgency, terrorism, and financial panics are important tasks of the state. Each outcome of these aggregate behaviors is an emergent property of a system in which each individual's action depends on a subset of others' actions, given by each individual's network of interactions. Yet there are few explicit comparisons of strategies for suppression, and none that fully incorporate the interdependence of individual behavior. Methods and Findings: Here I show that suppression tactics that do not require the removal of individuals from networks of interactions are nearly always more effective than those that do. I find using simulation analysis of a general model of interdependent behavior that the degree to which such less disruptive suppression tactics are superior to more disruptive ones increases in the propensity of individuals to engage in the behavior in question. Conclusions: Thus, hearts-and-minds approaches are generally more effective than force in counterterrorism and counterinsurgency, and partial insurance is usually a better tactic than gag rules in quelling financial panics. Differences between suppression tactics are greater when individual incentives to support terrorist or insurgent groups, or susceptibilities to financial panic, are higher. These conclusions have utility for policy-makers seeking to end bloody conflicts and prevent financial panics. As the model also applies to mass protest, its conclusions provide insight as well into the likely effects of different suppression strategies undertaken by authoritarian regimes seeking to hold on to power in the face of mass movements seeking to end them.

Suggested Citation

  • David A Siegel, 2011. "Non-Disruptive Tactics of Suppression Are Superior in Countering Terrorism, Insurgency, and Financial Panics," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 6(4), pages 1-6, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:plo:pone00:0018545
    DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0018545
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0018545
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article/file?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0018545&type=printable
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1371/journal.pone.0018545?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Rajkamal Iyer & Manju Puri, 2012. "Understanding Bank Runs: The Importance of Depositor-Bank Relationships and Networks," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(4), pages 1414-1445, June.
    2. Carmen M. Reinhart & Kenneth S. Rogoff, 2014. "This Time is Different: A Panoramic View of Eight Centuries of Financial Crises," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 15(2), pages 215-268, November.
    3. Carmen M. Reinhart & Kenneth S. Rogoff, 2009. "Varieties of Crises and Their Dates," Introductory Chapters, in: This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly, Princeton University Press.
    4. Mason, T David, 1996. "Insurgency, Counterinsurgency, and the Rational Peasant," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 86(1-2), pages 63-83, January.
    5. Eli Berman & Jacob N. Shapiro & Joseph H. Felter, 2011. "Can Hearts and Minds Be Bought? The Economics of Counterinsurgency in Iraq," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 119(4), pages 766-819.
    6. David A. Siegel, 2009. "Social Networks and Collective Action," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 53(1), pages 122-138, January.
    7. Scott D. McClurg, 2006. "The Electoral Relevance of Political Talk: Examining Disagreement and Expertise Effects in Social Networks on Political Participation," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 50(3), pages 737-754, July.
    8. D. Scott Bennett, 2008. "Governments, Civilians, and the Evolution of Insurgency: Modeling the Early Dynamics of Insurgencies," Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, vol. 11(4), pages 1-7.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Henrich R. Greve & Ji-Yub (Jay) Kim, 2014. "Running for the Exit: Community Cohesion and Bank Panics," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 25(1), pages 204-221, February.
    2. Jenter, Dirk & Aldunate, Felipe & Korteweg, Arthur & Koudijs, Peter, 2021. "Shareholder Liability and Bank Failure," CEPR Discussion Papers 16309, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    3. Buckmann, Marcus & Haldane, Andy & Hüser, Anne-Caroline, 2021. "Comparing minds and machines: implications for financial stability," Bank of England working papers 937, Bank of England.
    4. Committee, Nobel Prize, 2022. "Financial Intermediation and the Economy," Nobel Prize in Economics documents 2022-2, Nobel Prize Committee.
    5. Tölö, Eero, 2019. "Predicting systemic financial crises with recurrent neural networks," Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers 14/2019, Bank of Finland.
    6. Dani Rodrik, 2018. "Populism and the economics of globalization," Journal of International Business Policy, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 1(1), pages 12-33, June.
    7. Caruso, Alberto & Reichlin, Lucrezia & Ricco, Giovanni, 2019. "Financial and fiscal interaction in the Euro Area crisis: This time was different," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 119(C), pages 333-355.
    8. Daisuke Ikeda & Toan Phan & Timothy Sablik, 2020. "Asset Bubbles and Global Imbalances," Richmond Fed Economic Brief, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, vol. 20, pages 1-4, January.
    9. Karen K. Lewis, 2011. "Global Asset Pricing," Annual Review of Financial Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 3(1), pages 435-466, December.
    10. Carmen M. Reinhart & Kenneth S. Rogoff, 2014. "Recovery from Financial Crises: Evidence from 100 Episodes," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(5), pages 50-55, May.
    11. Claudio Borio, 2013. "On Time, Stocks and Flows: Understanding the Global Macroeconomic Challenges," National Institute Economic Review, National Institute of Economic and Social Research, vol. 225(1), pages 3-13, August.
    12. Ibrahim Ari & Muammer Koc, 2018. "Sustainable Financing for Sustainable Development: Understanding the Interrelations between Public Investment and Sovereign Debt," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 10(11), pages 1-25, October.
    13. Steven J. Davis & John C. Haltiwanger & Kyle Handley & Ben Lipsius & Josh Lerner & Javier Miranda, 2021. "The economic effects of private equity buyouts," Jena Economics Research Papers 2021-013, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
    14. Lamperti, Francesco & Bosetti, Valentina & Roventini, Andrea & Tavoni, Massimo & Treibich, Tania, 2021. "Three green financial policies to address climate risks," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 54(C).
    15. Manuel Funke & Moritz Schularick & Christoph Trebesch, 2023. "Populist Leaders and the Economy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 113(12), pages 3249-3288, December.
    16. Enrico Perotti & Magdelena Rola-Janicka, 2019. "Funding Shocks and Credit Quality," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 19-060/IV, Tinbergen Institute.
    17. Roos, Michael W. M., 2015. "The macroeconomics of radical uncertainty," Ruhr Economic Papers 592, RWI - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-University Bochum, TU Dortmund University, University of Duisburg-Essen.
    18. Roy, Saktinil & Kemme, David M., 2012. "Causes of banking crises: Deregulation, credit booms and asset bubbles, then and now," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 24(C), pages 270-294.
    19. Christoph Trebesch, 2019. "Resolving sovereign debt crises: the role of political risk," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 71(2), pages 421-444.
    20. Mr. Marco Arena & Serpil Bouza & Ms. Era Dabla-Norris & Mrs. Kerstin Gerling & Lamin Njie, 2015. "Credit Booms and Macroeconomic Dynamics: Stylized Facts and Lessons for Low-Income Countries," IMF Working Papers 2015/011, International Monetary Fund.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:plo:pone00:0018545. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: plosone (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://journals.plos.org/plosone/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.