Competition Policy in Europe – Temporary or Long-Lasting Changes?
AbstractDuring the first phase of the global crisis, the scale and scope of state aid increased at an unprecedented rate all over the world. Although their approval is – uniquely – part of competition policy in the European Union, the Commission and DG Competition did not oppose the unprecedented expansion of state aid. On the contrary, they played an active role in the modification and enforcement of frameworks. The paper analyses how EU regulation, prohibiting state aid for distorting competition, might be compatible with recent developments in this field. It comes to the conclusion that the European Commission proved to be strong enough to keep the regulation of distribution methods under control and to try to enforce the basic principles, but was unable to stem the tide of aid. By doing so, it contributed to the accumulation and growth of state deficits, the repeated destabilisation of financial markets and sovereign debts, and thus to the escalation of the second wave of the financial crisis in Europe in 2011.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by State Audit Office of Hungary in its journal Public Finance Quarterly.
Volume (Year): 57 (2012)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
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Web page: http://www.asz.hu
competition policy; state aid; crisis;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- H25 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Business Taxes and Subsidies
- H63 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Debt; Debt Management; Sovereign Debt
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2010_25, Business School - Economics, University of Glasgow.
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