Prevention and Private Health Insurance in the U.K
AbstractThis paper investigates empirically how different insurance plans affect individual behaviours in terms of prevention activities in the U.K. The data come from the British Household Panel Survey. We test if purchasing private health insurance modifies the probability of exercising, undergoing regular check-ups and smoking. Based on both simple probits and an IV strategy, our results suggest that, in the U.K., contracting private health insurance does not lead to less prevention. The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance (2004) 29, 719–727. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0440.2004.00313.x
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Palgrave Macmillan in its journal The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance.
Volume (Year): 29 (2004)
Issue (Month): 4 (October)
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