Commitment Problems Justify Subsidies for Medical Insurance
AbstractConsumers who believe that government will provide them with some public medical care, even if they did not purchase medical insurance, may choose to purchase no such insurance. The amount of medical care consumed will then be less than the first-best optimum. Under specified conditions government can then increase the welfare of consumers by subsidizing insurance, or by providing public health care at a more generous level than the minimum it would otherwise give. The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance Theory (1992) 17, 137â€“145. doi:10.1007/BF00962710
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Palgrave Macmillan in its journal The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance Theory.
Volume (Year): 17 (1992)
Issue (Month): 2 (December)
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Other versions of this item:
- Glazer, A. & Niskanen, E., 1991. "Commitment Problems Justify Subsidies For Medical Insurance," Papers, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences 90-91-11, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences.
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- Glazer, Amihai & Rothenberg, Lawrence S., 1999. "Increased capacity may exacerbate rationing problems: with applications to medical care," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 18(5), pages 669-678, October.
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