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Do Indirect Questions Reduce Lying about Corruption? Evidence from a Quasi-Field Experiment

Author

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  • George RG Clarke

    (Division of International Banking and Finance Studies, A.R. Sanchez, Jr. School of Business, Texas A&M International University, 5201 University Boulevard, Laredo, TX 78041, USA)

  • Klaus S Friesenbichler

    (Austrian Institute of Economic Research (WIFO), 1030 Wien, Arsenal, Objekt 20, Vienna, Austria)

  • Michael Wong

    (The World Bank, 1818 H Street N.W., Washington D.C. 20433, USA)

Abstract

Recent studies have found reticent managers are less likely to report corruption than are non-reticent managers. We confirm this using new data from Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. We find reticence greatly affects estimates of corruption for measures based on both direct and indirect questions. We also find reticence affects response rates. Surprisingly, reticent managers were less likely to refuse to answer questions on corruption than non-reticent managers, possibly because reticent managers believe that refusing to answer seems like a tacit admission of guilt. Throughout the analysis, we control for the potential endogeneity of the reticence measure.

Suggested Citation

  • George RG Clarke & Klaus S Friesenbichler & Michael Wong, 2015. "Do Indirect Questions Reduce Lying about Corruption? Evidence from a Quasi-Field Experiment," Comparative Economic Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Association for Comparative Economic Studies, vol. 57(1), pages 103-135, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:pal:compes:v:57:y:2015:i:1:p:103-135
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Bernard GAUTHIER & Frédéric LESNÉ, 2017. "Measuring corruption in presence of reticent respondents: Theory and Application," Working Papers P207, FERDI.
    2. Gauthier, Bernard & Goyette, Jonathan & Kouamé, Wilfried A.K., 2021. "Why do firms pay bribes? Evidence on the demand and supply sides of corruption in developing countries," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 190(C), pages 463-479.
    3. Bernard GAUTHIER & Frédéric LESNÉ, 2018. "Reported Corruption vs. Experience of Corruption in Public Procurement Contracts," Working Papers P242, FERDI.
    4. Luca J. Uberti, 2020. "Bribes, Rents and Industrial Firm Performance in Albania and Kosovo," Comparative Economic Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Association for Comparative Economic Studies, vol. 62(2), pages 263-302, June.
    5. George R. G. Clarke, 2021. "How Do Women Managers Avoid Paying Bribes?," Economies, MDPI, vol. 9(1), pages 1-18, February.
    6. Julien Hanoteau & Gandhi Pawitan & Virginie Vial, 2021. "Does social capital reduce entrepreneurs' petty corruption? Evidence across Indonesian regions," Papers in Regional Science, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 100(3), pages 651-670, June.
    7. Kim, Sahrok & Praveen Parboteeah, K. & Cullen, John B. & Jeong, Nara, 2022. "Social institutions approach to women’s firm ownership and firm bribery activity: A study of small-sized firms in emerging markets," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 144(C), pages 1333-1349.

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