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The Timing and Method of Payment in Mergers when Acquirers Are Financially Constrained

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  • Alexander S Gorbenko
  • Andrey Malenko

Abstract

Although acquisitions are a popular form of investment, the link between firms’ financial constraints and acquisition policies is not well understood. We develop a model in which financially constrained bidders approach targets, decide how much to bid and whether to bid in cash or in stock. In equilibrium, financial constraints do not affect the identity of the winning bidder, but they lower bidders’ incentives to approach the target. Auctions are initiated by bidders with low constraints or high synergies. The use of cash is positively related to synergies and the acquirer’s gains from the deal and negatively to financial constraints. Received March 3, 2016; editorial decision August 18, 2017 by Editor Itay Goldstein. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.

Suggested Citation

  • Alexander S Gorbenko & Andrey Malenko, 2018. "The Timing and Method of Payment in Mergers when Acquirers Are Financially Constrained," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 31(10), pages 3937-3978.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:rfinst:v:31:y:2018:i:10:p:3937-3978.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/rfs/hhx126
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    Cited by:

    1. Attaoui, Sami & Cao, Wenbin & Six, Pierre, 2021. "Capital structure and the optimal payment methods in acquisitions," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(C).
    2. Tingjun Liu & Dan Bernhardt, 2021. "Rent Extraction with Securities Plus Cash," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 76(4), pages 1869-1912, August.
    3. Nejadmalayeri, Ali & Rosenblum, Aaron, 2022. "Distressed acquirers and the bright side of financial distress," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 83(C).
    4. de Bodt, Eric & Cousin, Jean-Gabriel & Officer, Micah S., 2022. "Financial constraints, ownership dilution, and the method of payment in M&A transactions," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 75(C).
    5. Kose John & Qianru Qi & Jing Wang, 2020. "Bank Integration and the Market for Corporate Control: Evidence from Cross-State Acquisitions," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 66(7), pages 3277-3294, July.
    6. Hasan, Iftekhar & Huang, He & To, Thomas Y., 2021. "Are credit rating disagreements priced in the M&A market?," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 72(C).
    7. Moritzen, Mark Raun & Schandlbauer, Alexander, 2020. "The impact of competition and time-to-finance on corporate cash holdings," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 65(C).
    8. Junkun Zhao & Zhe Shen & Yong Huang, 2023. "IPO suspension and pricing: Evidence from China," Accounting and Finance, Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 63(5), pages 5143-5182, December.
    9. Mingtao Yu & Aiguo Yan, 2022. "Can Digital Finance Accelerate the Digital Transformation of Companies? From the Perspective of M&A," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 14(21), pages 1-16, November.
    10. Fang, Tian Jin & Han, Jianlei & He, Jing & Shi, Jing, 2021. "Property rights protection and mergers and acquisitions," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 68(C).
    11. Nishihara, Michi & Shibata, Takashi, 2019. "Liquidation, fire sales, and acquirers’ private information," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 108(C).
    12. Chen, Chong & Wu, Xueping, 2021. "Winning megadeals: The dual role of acquirer advisors in loan-financed mergers and acquisitions," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 69(C).

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