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Distinguishing the Effect of Overconfidence from Rational Best-Response on Information Aggregation

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  • Shimon Kogan

Abstract

This article studies the causal effect of individuals' overconfidence and bounded rationality on information aggregation by using a new multiperiod game in which agents are rewarded for submitting accurate estimates of an unknown asset's value based on (i) their private information and (ii) others' past estimates. By carrying out laboratory sessions of this game in which subjects' overconfidence is a treatment variable, I find that overconfidence affects the information aggregation process by increasing the dispersion of estimates and decreasing the rate of estimates' convergence. However, even when subjects are not overconfident, qualitatively similar deviations from the fully rational model predictions are observed. I show that this can be explained by subjects' strategic response to errors. The Author 2008. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org, Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Shimon Kogan, 2009. "Distinguishing the Effect of Overconfidence from Rational Best-Response on Information Aggregation," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 22(5), pages 1889-1914, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:rfinst:v:22:y:2009:i:5:p:1889-1914
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/rfs/hhn075
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    Cited by:

    1. Brice Corgnet & Mark DeSantis & David Porter, 2020. "Information Aggregation and the Cognitive Make-up of Traders," Working Papers 20-18, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
    2. Camelia M. Kuhnen, 2015. "Asymmetric Learning from Financial Information," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 70(5), pages 2029-2062, October.
    3. Fellner-Röhling, Gerlinde & Krügel, Sebastian, 2014. "Judgmental overconfidence and trading activity," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 107(PB), pages 827-842.
    4. Menachem Brenner & Yehuda Izhakian & Orly Sade, 2011. "Ambiguity and Overconfidence," Working Papers 11-06, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
    5. Corgnet, Brice & DeSantis, Mark & Porter, David, 2021. "Information aggregation and the cognitive make-up of market participants," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 133(C).
    6. Eric Van den Steen, 2011. "Overconfidence by Bayesian-Rational Agents," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 57(5), pages 884-896, May.
    7. Victor, Bart & Fischer, Edward F. & Cooil, Bruce & Vergara, Alfredo & Mukolo, Abraham & Blevins, Meridith, 2013. "Frustrated Freedom: The Effects of Agency and Wealth on Wellbeing in Rural Mozambique," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 47(C), pages 30-41.
    8. Markus Spiwoks & Kilian Bizer, 2018. "On the Measurement of Overconfidence: An Experimental Study," International Journal of Economics and Financial Research, Academic Research Publishing Group, vol. 4(1), pages 30-37, 01-2018.

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