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Does Advertising Serve as a Signal? Evidence from a Field Experiment in Mobile Search

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  • Navdeep S Sahni
  • Harikesh S Nair

Abstract

We develop a field experiment that assesses whether advertising can serve as a signal that enhances consumers' evaluations of advertised goods. We implement the experiment on a mobile search platform that provides listings and reviews for an archetypal experience good, restaurants. In collaboration with the platform, we randomize about 200,000 users in 13 Asian cities into exposure of ads for about 600+ local restaurants. Within the exposure group, we randomly vary the disclosure to the consumer of whether a restaurant's listing is a paid-ad. This enables isolating the effect on outcomes of a user knowing that a listing is sponsored—a pure signalling effect. We find that this disclosure increases calls to the restaurant by 77%, holding fixed all other attributes of the ad. The disclosure effect is higher when the consumer uses the platform away from his typical city of search, when the uncertainty about restaurant quality is larger, and for restaurants that have received fewer ratings in the past. On the supply side, newer, higher rated and more popular restaurants are found to advertise more on the platform; and ratings of those that advertised during the experiment are found to be higher two years later. Taken together, we interpret these results as consistent with a signalling equilibrium in which ads serve as implicit signals that enhance the appeal of the advertised restaurants to consumers. Both consumers and advertisers seem to benefit from the signalling. Consumers shift choices towards restaurants that are better rated (at baseline) in the disclosure group compared to the no disclosure group, and advertisers gain from the improved outcomes induced by disclosure.

Suggested Citation

  • Navdeep S Sahni & Harikesh S Nair, 2020. "Does Advertising Serve as a Signal? Evidence from a Field Experiment in Mobile Search," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 87(3), pages 1529-1564.
  • Handle: RePEc:oup:restud:v:87:y:2020:i:3:p:1529-1564.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/restud/rdz053
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    Cited by:

    1. Navdeep S. Sahni & Harikesh S. Nair, 2020. "Sponsorship Disclosure and Consumer Deception: Experimental Evidence from Native Advertising in Mobile Search," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 39(1), pages 5-32, January.
    2. Caio Waisman & Navdeep S. Sahni & Harikesh S. Nair & Xiliang Lin, 2019. "Parallel Experimentation and Competitive Interference on Online Advertising Platforms," Papers 1903.11198, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2024.
    3. Bart J. Bronnenberg & Jean-Pierre Dubé & Chad Syverson, 2022. "Marketing Investment and Intangible Brand Capital," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 36(3), pages 53-74, Summer.
    4. Guy Aridor & Duarte Gonçalves & Daniel Kluver & Ruoyan Kong & Joseph Konstan, 2022. "The Economics of Recommender Systems: Evidence from a Field Experiment on MovieLens," CESifo Working Paper Series 10129, CESifo.
    5. Fei Long & Kinshuk Jerath & Miklos Sarvary, 2022. "Designing an Online Retail Marketplace: Leveraging Information from Sponsored Advertising," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 41(1), pages 115-138, January.
    6. Weijia Dai & Hyunjin Kim & Michael Luca, 2023. "Frontiers: Which Firms Gain from Digital Advertising? Evidence from a Field Experiment," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 42(3), pages 429-439, May.
    7. Lingfang (Ivy) Li & Steven Tadelis & Xiaolan Zhou, 2020. "Buying reputation as a signal of quality: Evidence from an online marketplace," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 51(4), pages 965-988, December.
    8. Cao, Zike & Belo, Rodrigo, 2023. "Effects of Explicit Sponsorship Disclosure on User Engagement in Social Media Influencer Marketing," SocArXiv b8tsg, Center for Open Science.
    9. Roberto Burguet & Vaiva Petrikaite, 2017. "Targeted Advertising and Costly Consumer Search," Working Papers 971, Barcelona School of Economics.
    10. Yi-Lin Tsai & Elisabeth Honka, 2021. "Informational and Noninformational Advertising Content," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 40(6), pages 1030-1058, November.
    11. Weijia Dai & Hyunjin Kim & Michael Luca, 2016. "Which Firms Gain from Digital Advertising? Evidence from a Field Experiment," Harvard Business School Working Papers 17-025, Harvard Business School, revised Jan 2023.

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