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The Sunk-Cost Fallacy in Penny Auctions

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  • Ned Augenblick

Abstract

This article theoretically and empirically analyses behaviour in penny auctions, a relatively new auction mechanism. As in the US dollars or war-of-attrition, players in penny auctions commit higher non-refundable costs as the auction continues and only win if all other players stop bidding. I first show that, in any equilibria that does not end immediately, players bid probabilistically such that the expected profit from every bid is zero. Then, using two large data sets covering 166,000 auctions, I calculate that average profit margins actually exceed 50%. To explain this deviation, I incorporate a sunk-cost fallacy into the theoretical model to generate a set of predictions about hazard rates and player behaviour, which I confirm empirically. While players do (slowly) learn to correct this bias and there are few obvious barriers to competition, activity in the market is rising and concentration remains relatively high.

Suggested Citation

  • Ned Augenblick, 2016. "The Sunk-Cost Fallacy in Penny Auctions," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 83(1), pages 58-86.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:restud:v:83:y:2016:i:1:p:58-86.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/restud/rdv037
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    Cited by:

    1. Dimuthu Ratnadiwakara & Vijay Yerramilli, 2022. "Do Sunk Costs Affect Prices in the Housing Market?," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(12), pages 9061-9081, December.
    2. Shakun D. Mago & Roman M. Sheremeta, 2019. "New Hampshire Effect: behavior in sequential and simultaneous multi-battle contests," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 22(2), pages 325-349, June.
    3. Ronayne, David & Sgroi, Daniel & Tuckwell, Anthony, 2020. "Evaluating the Sunk Cost Effect," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 1269, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
    4. Ronayne, David & Sgroi, Daniel & Tuckwell, Anthony, 2021. "Evaluating the sunk cost effect," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 186(C), pages 318-327.
    5. Zhongmin Wang & Minbo Xu, 2016. "Empirical Evidence on Competition and Revenue in an All-Pay Contest," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 49(3), pages 429-448, November.
    6. Jin Li & Kwok Fai Tso & Fangtao Liu, 2017. "Profit earning and monetary loss bidding in online entertainment shopping: the impacts of bidding patterns and characteristics," Electronic Markets, Springer;IIM University of St. Gallen, vol. 27(1), pages 77-90, February.
    7. Kimbrough, Erik O. & Laughren, Kevin & Sheremeta, Roman, 2020. "War and conflict in economics: Theories, applications, and recent trends," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 178(C), pages 998-1013.
    8. Marcello Negrini & Arno Riedl & Matthias Wibral, 2020. "Still in Search of the Sunk Cost Bias," CESifo Working Paper Series 8623, CESifo.
    9. Negrini, Marcello & Riedl, Arno & Wibral, Matthias, 2022. "Sunk cost in investment decisions," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 200(C), pages 1105-1135.
    10. Brünner, Tobias & Reiner, Jochen & Natter, Martin & Skiera, Bernd, 2019. "Prospect theory in a dynamic game: Theory and evidence from online pay-per-bid auctions," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 164(C), pages 215-234.
    11. Hyndman, Kyle, 2023. "Dynamic fairness in repeated bargaining with risk," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 94(C).
    12. Fredrik Ødegaard & Charles Z. Zheng, 2023. "Trilateral escalation in the dollar auction," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 52(1), pages 195-230, March.
    13. Hinnosaar, Toomas, 2016. "Penny auctions," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 59-87.
    14. Maurizio Canavari & Andreas C. Drichoutis & Jayson L. Lusk & Rodolfo M. Nayga, Jr., 2018. "How to run an experimental auction: A review of recent advances," Working Papers 2018-5, Agricultural University of Athens, Department Of Agricultural Economics.
    15. Hackinger, Julian, 2019. "Ignoring millions of Euros: Transfer fees and sunk costs in professional football," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 75(PB).

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