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Examining economic organization through the lens of contract

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Author Info
Oliver E. Williamson

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Abstract

The lens of contract approach to the study of economic organization is partly complementary but also partly rival to the orthodox lens of choice. Specifically, whereas the latter focuses on simple market exchange, the lens of contract is predominantly concerned with the complex contracts. Among the major differences is that non-standard and unfamiliar contractual practices and organizational structures that orthodoxy interprets as manifestations of monopoly are often perceived to serve economizing purposes under the lens of contract. A major reason for these and other differences is that orthodoxy is dismissive of organization theory whereas organization theory provides conceptual foundations for the lens of contract. Copyright 2003, Oxford University Press.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Oxford University Press in its journal Industrial and Corporate Change.

Volume (Year): 12 (2003)
Issue (Month): 4 (August)
Pages: 917-942
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Handle: RePEc:oup:indcch:v:12:y:2003:i:4:p:917-942

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  1. Elsner, Wolfram & Hocker, Gero & Schwardt, Henning, 2009. "Simplistic vs. Complex Organization: Markets, Hierarchies, and Networks in an 'Organizational Triangle'," MPRA Paper 14315, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  2. Helmut Dietl & Egon Franck & Markus Lang, 2008. "Why football players may benefit from the ‘shadow of the transfer system’," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 26(2), pages 129-151, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Fernando Toboso, 2006. "Old organizational issues from a new institutional economics perspective. Some introductory remarks," Revista de Analisis Economico – Economic Analysis Review, Ilades-Georgetown University, Economics Department, vol. 21(2), pages 3-11, December. [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2009-11-28.


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