This paper discusses the linkages among the different obligations entailed in the GATT Agreement on Agriculture. It is shown that each country's choice between feasible policy alternatives crucially depends on the analogous choices made by other countries. This means that there is a game structure inherent in the GATT implementation process. Any modelling effort aimed at forecasting the implications of implementing the GATT Agreement which does not take into consideration the linkages among the various commitments, the policy choices to be made by each country, or the game structure inherent in the implementation process, is likely to yield incorrect results. Copyright 1997 by Oxford University Press.
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Article provided by Oxford University Press for the Foundation for the European Review of Agricultural Economics in its journal European Review of Agricultural Economics.