Dynamic Common Agency and Investment: The Economics of Movie Distribution
AbstractThis article analyzes investment and other strategies in a stationary dynamic common agency model of movie distribution. Contract choices interact with other strategic choices. The model explains several facts; movie distributors avoid head-to-head new hit releases, hits have longer runs than flops, and distributors receive the lion's share of value generated by hits. The model yields testable implications about the effects of vertical integration on inventory turnover, release decisions, run lengths, and allocations, but the results depend on how integration affects relative bargaining power. Vertical integration is privately profitable and may improve social welfare even though it reduces industry profits. (JEL L14, L22, L82, C61) Copyright 2005, Oxford University Press.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Western Economic Association International in its journal Economic Inquiry.
Volume (Year): 43 (2005)
Issue (Month): 4 (October)
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
- L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
- L82 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Entertainment; Media
- C61 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis
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- Darlene C. Chisholm & Margaret S. McMillan & George Norman, 2006.
"Product Differentiation and Film Programming Choice: Do First-Run Movie Theatres Show the Same Films?,"
NBER Working Papers
12646, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Darlene Chisholm & Margaret McMillan & George Norman, 2010. "Product differentiation and film-programming choice: do first-run movie theatres show the same films?," Journal of Cultural Economics, Springer, vol. 34(2), pages 131-145, May.
- Darlene C. Chisolm & Margaret McMillan & George Norman, 2007. "Product Differentiation and Film Programming Choice: Do First-Run Movie Theatres Show the Same Films?," Discussion Papers Series, Department of Economics, Tufts University 0713, Department of Economics, Tufts University.
- Darlene C. Chisholm & Margaret S. McMillan & George Norman, 2005. "Product Differentiation and Film Programming Choice: Do First-Run Movie Theatres Show the Same Films?," Discussion Papers Series, Department of Economics, Tufts University 0523, Department of Economics, Tufts University.
- Ricard Gil & Wesley Hartmann, 2007. "The Role and Determinants of Concession Sales in Movie Theaters: Evidence from the Spanish Exhibition Industry," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, vol. 30(4), pages 325-347, June.
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