Voter Preferences and State Regulation of Smoking
AbstractVoters' preferences for smoking restrictions in restaurants, bars, malls, indoor sporting events, and hospitals are consistent with state-level restrictions on smoking in each of these public areas. This analysis is based on constructed measures of political pressure that take into account both individual preferences and voting behavior. Although smokers are less likely to vote than nonsmokers, their lower voting rate does not substantially influence the probability that a state has a restriction. Other factors, such as tobacco's role in the state economy and state income, are rarely influential. (JEL H70, I18, K32) Copyright 2004, Oxford University Press.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Western Economic Association International in its journal Economic Inquiry.
Volume (Year): 42 (2004)
Issue (Month): 3 (July)
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- H70 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - General
- I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
- K32 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Environmental, Health, and Safety Law
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- W. Kip Viscusi & Joni Hersch, 2010.
"Tobacco Regulation through Litigation: The Master Settlement Agreement,"
in: Regulation vs. Litigation: Perspectives from Economics and Law, pages 71-101
National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- W. Kip Viscusi & Joni Hersch, 2009. "Tobacco Regulation through Litigation: The Master Settlement Agreement," NBER Working Papers 15422, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- E. Dijkgraaf & R.H.J.M. Gradus, 2006. "Deregulating Sunday Shop Policies," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 06-003/3, Tinbergen Institute.
- Philip DeCicca & Donald S. Kenkel & Alan D. Mathios & Yoon-Jeong Shin & Jae-Young Lim, 2006.
"Youth Smoking, Cigarette Prices, and Anti-Smoking Sentiment,"
NBER Working Papers
12458, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Philip DeCicca & Donald Kenkel & Alan Mathios & Yoon-Jeong Shin & Jae-Young Lim, 2008. "Youth smoking, cigarette prices, and anti-smoking sentiment," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 17(6), pages 733-749.
- Joni Hersch, 2005. "Smoking Restrictions as a Self-Control Mechanism," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 31(1), pages 5-21, July.
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