Information Sharing and Tacit Collusion in Laboratory Duopoly Markets
AbstractThis paper reports forty-five laboratory duopoly markets that examine the importance of information sharing in facilitating tacit collusion under conditions of demand uncertainty. Sellers in these repeated laboratory markets generally shared information when possible to reduce their demand uncertainty, which led to output reductions in some demand states. Risk aversion is a likely explanation for this sharing but some sellers also appeared to employ a strategy of information concealment to punish noncolluding rivals. Nevertheless, output choices were similar in control treatments that forced sellers to share or conceal information, so the information sharing itself did not substantially increase tacit collusion. Copyright 1999 by Oxford University Press.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Western Economic Association International in its journal Economic Inquiry.
Volume (Year): 37 (1999)
Issue (Month): 2 (April)
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- Suetens, S., 2004.
"Literature review: R&D cooperation in oligopoly with spillovers: An experimental economics approach,"
Open Access publications from Tilburg University
urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-3529827, Tilburg University.
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- Kazunori Miwa, 2013. "The Impact of Mandatory Disclosure on Information Acquisition: Theory and Experiment," Discussion Papers in Economics and Business 13-01, Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics and Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP).
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- Chang, Chun-Hao & Prakash, Arun J. & Yeh, Shu, 2004. "Sale of monopoly information and behavior of rivaling clients: A theoretical perspective," Review of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(3), pages 283-304.
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- repec:ebl:ecbull:v:3:y:2002:i:6:p:1-11 is not listed on IDEAS
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