Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

What's Legal and What's Not: The Regulation of Opiates in 1912

Contents:

Author Info

  • Michaels, Robert J
Registered author(s):

    Abstract

    This paper develops a model to explain state-level opiate regulation in 1912. The personal choice of whether to engage in mainstream or deviant activity is determined by consumption technology and market prices, and voting determines the legality of deviant behavior. Voting outcomes depend on population characteristics including diversity, tolerance, visibility of deviance, and the distribution of consumption efficiencies. A logit equation whose dependent variable is the presence of a state opiate prescription law is estimated. Results broadly support the collective choice model and disconfirm the role of interest groups, particularly physicians, in determining prescription regulation. Copyright 1992 by Oxford University Press.

    Download Info

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Western Economic Association International in its journal Economic Inquiry.

    Volume (Year): 30 (1992)
    Issue (Month): 4 (October)
    Pages: 696-713

    as in new window
    Handle: RePEc:oup:ecinqu:v:30:y:1992:i:4:p:696-713

    Contact details of provider:
    Postal: Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK
    Phone: 714-965-8800
    Fax: 01865 267 985
    Email:
    Web page: http://ei.oupjournals.org/
    More information through EDIRC

    Order Information:
    Web: http://www.oup.co.uk/journals

    Related research

    Keywords:

    References

    No references listed on IDEAS
    You can help add them by filling out this form.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as in new window

    Cited by:
    1. Potters, Jan & Sloof, Randolph, 1996. "Interest groups: A survey of empirical models that try to assess their influence," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 403-442, November.
    2. Yang, Bijou & Lester, David, 1995. "New directions for economics," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 433-446.

    Lists

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oup:ecinqu:v:30:y:1992:i:4:p:696-713. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Oxford University Press) or (Christopher F. Baum).

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.