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Efficiency Wages and Equilibrium Wages

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  • Black, Dan A
  • Garen, John E

Abstract

The authors present a labor-market model that allows as special cases a market paying equilibrium wages, one paying disequilibrium efficiency wages, and a market combining the two. Their analysis indicates that industrial wage differentials are not necessarily evidence of efficiency wages. Such differentials may be explained by differences across industries in labor performance standards or in the accuracy with which worker effort can be measured. The authors do find, however, that the relationship between wages and dismissals can be used to distinguish a market paying equilibrium wages from one paying efficiency wages. Copyright 1991 by Oxford University Press.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Western Economic Association International in its journal Economic Inquiry.

Volume (Year): 29 (1991)
Issue (Month): 3 (July)
Pages: 525-40

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Handle: RePEc:oup:ecinqu:v:29:y:1991:i:3:p:525-40

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Cited by:
  1. Pablo González, 2002. "Profit Sharing Reconsidered: Efficiency Wages and Renegotiation Costs," Documentos de Trabajo 151, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
  2. STROBL, Eric & WALSH, Frank, 2003. "Estimating the shirking model with variable effort," CORE Discussion Papers 2003075, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  3. Lang, Oliver, 1993. "Lohnprämien und Leistungsbereitschaft: Ein latentes Strukturmodell zur empirischen Überprüfung der Shirking-Hypothese," ZEW Discussion Papers 93-17, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.

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