Production Externalities and Long-run Equilibria: Bargaining and Pigovian Taxation
AbstractThis paper analyzes bargaining and Pigovian taxation solutions to inefficiencies from production externalities with free entry. The Coase Theorem fails in a decentralized context, but remains valid if the property rights holder can act like a command economy planner. A less-powerful, price-taking rights holder's objective function is nonconcave, causing an inefficient bargaining outcome. Bargaining complicates Pigovian taxes with a nonlinear tax scheme required to sustain the optimum. Polluting firms pay a franchise tax whose revenue is given lump sum to consumers and face a marginal charge only on excess output, which, thus, raises no revenue in equilibrium. Copyright 1989 by Oxford University Press.
Download InfoTo our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Western Economic Association International in its journal Economic Inquiry.
Volume (Year): 27 (1989)
Issue (Month): 3 (July)
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK
Fax: 01865 267 985
Web page: http://ei.oupjournals.org/
More information through EDIRC
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Grafton, Quentin R. & Devlin, Rose Anne, 1994. "Les permis d’émission et les charges : efficacité et substituabilité," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 70(2), pages 159-176, juin.
- Henry, Claude, 1991. "Finances publiques et environnement : tensions et convergences," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 67(3), pages 267-278, septembre.
- Cropper, Maureen L & Oates, Wallace E, 1992. "Environmental Economics: A Survey," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 30(2), pages 675-740, June.
- Brito, Dagobert L. & Hamilton, Jonathan H. & Intriligator, Michael D. & Sheshinski, Eytan & Slutsky, Steven M., 2006. "Private information, Coasian bargaining, and the second welfare theorem," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(4-5), pages 871-895, May.
- Anil Markandya & Dirk T.G. Rübbelke, 2012.
"Impure public technologies and environmental policy,"
Journal of Economic Studies,
Emerald Group Publishing, vol. 39(2), pages 128-143, May.
- Dirk T.G. Rübbelke & Anil Markandya, 2008. "Impure Public Technologies and Environmental Policy," Working Papers 2008.76, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- Allan C. DeSerpa, 1992. "The Pure Economics of the Coase Theorem," Eastern Economic Journal, Eastern Economic Association, vol. 18(3), pages 287-304, Summer.
- Hamilton, Stephen F., 1998.
"Taxation, Fines, And Producer Liability Rules: Efficiency And Market Structure Implications,"
1998 Annual meeting, August 2-5, Salt Lake City, UT
20928, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
- Stephen F. Hamilton, 1998. "Taxation, Fines, and Producer Liability Rules: Efficiency and Market Structure Implications," Southern Economic Journal, Southern Economic Association, vol. 65(1), pages 140-150, July.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Oxford University Press) or (Christopher F. Baum).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.