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Taxation, Fines, And Producer Liability Rules: Efficiency And Market Structure Implications

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  • Hamilton, Stephen F.

Abstract

This paper addresses the comparative efficiency of liability rules and regulatory policy in competitive equilibria with endogenous product safety. Pigouvian taxation fails to achieve long-run social optimality. A policy involving accident fines and safety subsidization can achieve efficiency, although the optimal policy may involve taxation, not subsidization, of product safety.

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File URL: http://purl.umn.edu/20928
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association) in its series 1998 Annual meeting, August 2-5, Salt Lake City, UT with number 20928.

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Date of creation: 1998
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Handle: RePEc:ags:aaea98:20928

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Keywords: Public Economics;

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  1. Carlton, Dennis W & Loury, Glenn C, 1980. "The Limitations of Pigouvian Taxes as a Long-Run Remedy for Externalities," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 95(3), pages 559-66, November.
  2. Hamilton, Jonathan H & Sheshinski, Eytan & Slutsky, Steven M, 1989. "Production Externalities and Long-run Equilibria: Bargaining and Pigovian Taxation," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 27(3), pages 453-71, July.
  3. Kolstad, Charles D & Ulen, Thomas S & Johnson, Gary V, 1990. "Ex Post Liability for Harm vs. Ex Ante Safety Regulation: Substitutes or Complements?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(4), pages 888-901, September.
  4. Ringleb, Al H & Wiggins, Steven N, 1990. "Liability and Large-Scale, Long-term Hazards," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(3), pages 574-95, June.
  5. Hamada, Koichi, 1976. "Liability Rules and Income Distribution in Product Liability," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 66(1), pages 228-34, March.
  6. Marino, Anthony M., 1988. "Products liability and scale effects in a long-run competitive equilibrium," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 97-107, June.
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Cited by:
  1. Bruce Hay & Kathryn E. Spier, 2005. "Manufacturer Liability for Harms Caused by Consumers to Others," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(5), pages 1700-1711, December.
  2. Stephan Marette & Estelle Gozlan & Bénédicte Coestier, 2004. "On the Limitation of Penalties and the Non-Equivalence of Penalties and Taxes," Working Papers 2004/02, INRA, Economie Publique.
  3. Ram Singh, 2008. "Risk, Informational Asymmetry and Product Liability; An enquiry into conflicting objectives," Working papers 164, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.
  4. Bruce Hay & Kathryn E. Spier, 2004. "Manufacturer Liability for Harms Caused by Consumers to Others," NBER Working Papers 10972, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

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