Taxation, Fines, And Producer Liability Rules: Efficiency And Market Structure Implications
AbstractThis paper addresses the comparative efficiency of liability rules and regulatory policy in competitive equilibria with endogenous product safety. Pigouvian taxation fails to achieve long-run social optimality. A policy involving accident fines and safety subsidization can achieve efficiency, although the optimal policy may involve taxation, not subsidization, of product safety.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association) in its series 1998 Annual meeting, August 2-5, Salt Lake City, UT with number 20928.
Date of creation: 1998
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Other versions of this item:
- Stephen F. Hamilton, 1998. "Taxation, Fines, and Producer Liability Rules: Efficiency and Market Structure Implications," Southern Economic Journal, Southern Economic Association, vol. 65(1), pages 140-150, July.
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