Aldrich-Vreeland Emergency Currency as a Lender of Last Resort
AbstractThis paper investigates borrowing from a lender of last resort at the individual bank level using data from a pre-Federal Reserve lender of last resort program, the Aldrich-Vreeland Emergency Currency Act of 1908. Contrary to the reluctance to borrow hypothesis, banks with lower capital/asset ratios were more likely to borrow. Banks with a higher reserve ratio borrowed less.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Missouri Valley Economic Association in its journal The Journal of Economics.
Volume (Year): 38 (2012)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
- E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
- N22 - Economic History - - Financial Markets and Institutions - - - U.S.; Canada: 1913-
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- Margaret Jacobson & Ellis W. Tallman, 2013. "Liquidity provision during the crisis of 1914: private and public sources," Working Paper 1304, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
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