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A Note on Voting over Taxes with Tax Avoidance

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  • Zhiyong An

Abstract

We study majority voting over taxes when tax avoidance is possible, focusing on the progressivity of effective tax burdens and how government policy can affect it. We show that: (1) whether effective tax burdens are progressive or not depends on the distribution of individuals' pre-tax income, the per capita government revenue requirement, and the government enforcement level; and (2) both a lower per capita government revenue requirement and a higher government enforcement level can help ensure that effective tax burdens are progressive.

Suggested Citation

  • Zhiyong An, 2015. "A Note on Voting over Taxes with Tax Avoidance," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 71(3), pages 407-414, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:mhr:finarc:urn:sici:0015-2218(201509)71:3_407:anovot_2.0.tx_2-r
    DOI: 10.1628/001522108X14331675558726
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    majority voting; income taxation; tax avoidance; progressivity;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H2 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue

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