IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/kap/revind/v63y2023i4d10.1007_s11151-023-09930-0.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Economics at the FTC: Spatial Demand, Veterinary Hospital Mergers, Rulemaking, and Noncompete Agreements

Author

Listed:
  • Abigail Ferguson

    (Federal Trade Commission, Bureau of Economics)

  • Nellie Lew

    (Federal Trade Commission, Bureau of Economics)

  • Michael Lipsitz

    (Federal Trade Commission, Bureau of Economics)

  • Devesh Raval

    (Federal Trade Commission, Bureau of Economics)

Abstract

The U.S. Federal Trade Commission enforces federal competition and consumer protection laws that prevent anticompetitive, deceptive, and unfair business practices, and works to advance government policies that protect consumers and promote competition. The FTC’s Bureau of Economics performs economic analysis to support both the enforcement and policy activities of the Commission. This article discusses several examples of these activities. We first discuss some work our economists have done on spatial considerations in demand estimation, and then present an analytical approach that has been developed to assess consumer choice between service providers with the use of data on geographic variation in the location of the customers of two merging service providers. We apply this technique in the context of the analysis of the competitive effects of a merger of veterinary hospitals. Next, we discuss an important tool in the FTC’s arsenal: rulemaking. We describe the benefits and costs of rulemaking, the rulemaking process, and the role of economic analysis in that process, and then highlight recent FTC rulemaking activities and the economic analysis of a proposed rulemaking that would ban employers from imposing non-compete clauses in employment contracts.

Suggested Citation

  • Abigail Ferguson & Nellie Lew & Michael Lipsitz & Devesh Raval, 2023. "Economics at the FTC: Spatial Demand, Veterinary Hospital Mergers, Rulemaking, and Noncompete Agreements," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 63(4), pages 435-465, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:revind:v:63:y:2023:i:4:d:10.1007_s11151-023-09930-0
    DOI: 10.1007/s11151-023-09930-0
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11151-023-09930-0
    File Function: Abstract
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s11151-023-09930-0?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Liran Einav & Amy Finkelstein & Atul Gupta, 2017. "Is American Pet Health Care (Also) Uniquely Inefficient?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 107(5), pages 491-495, May.
    2. McFadden, Daniel L., 1984. "Econometric analysis of qualitative response models," Handbook of Econometrics, in: Z. Griliches† & M. D. Intriligator (ed.), Handbook of Econometrics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 24, pages 1395-1457, Elsevier.
    3. Evan Starr & Natarajan Balasubramanian & Natarajan Balasubramanian, 2018. "Screening Spinouts? How Noncompete Enforceability Affects the Creation, Growth, and Survival of New Firms," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 64(2), pages 552-572, February.
    4. Gautam Gowrisankaran & Aviv Nevo & Robert Town, 2015. "Mergers When Prices Are Negotiated: Evidence from the Hospital Industry," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 105(1), pages 172-203, January.
    5. Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, 1974. "An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 3(1), pages 257-286, January.
    6. Miller, Nathan H. & Remer, Marc & Ryan, Conor & Sheu, Gloria, 2017. "Upward pricing pressure as a predictor of merger price effects," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 52(C), pages 216-247.
    7. Devesh Raval & Ted Rosenbaum, 2021. "Why is Distance Important for Hospital Choice? Separating Home Bias From Transport Costs," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 69(2), pages 338-368, June.
    8. Matthew S. Johnson & Michael Lipsitz, 2022. "Why Are Low-Wage Workers Signing Noncompete Agreements?," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 57(3), pages 689-724.
    9. Orley C. Ashenfelter & Daniel S. Hosken & Matthew C. Weinberg, 2015. "Efficiencies brewed: pricing and consolidation in the US beer industry," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 46(2), pages 328-361, June.
    10. Michael Lipsitz & Evan Starr, 2022. "Low-Wage Workers and the Enforceability of Noncompete Agreements," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(1), pages 143-170, January.
    11. Devesh Raval & Ted Rosenbaum, 2018. "Why Do Previous Choices Matter for Hospital Demand? Decomposing Switching Costs from Unobserved Preferences," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 100(5), pages 906-915, December.
    12. Devesh Raval & Ted Rosenbaum & Nathan E. Wilson, 2022. "Using disaster‐induced closures to evaluate discrete choice models of hospital demand," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 53(3), pages 561-589, September.
    13. Eric Barrette & Gautam Gowrisankaran & Robert Town, 2022. "Countervailing Market Power and Hospital Competition," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 104(6), pages 1351-1360, November.
    14. Capps, Cory & Dranove, David & Satterthwaite, Mark, 2003. "Competition and Market Power in Option Demand Markets," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 34(4), pages 737-763, Winter.
    15. Katherine Ho, 2006. "The welfare effects of restricted hospital choice in the US medical care market," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 21(7), pages 1039-1079.
    16. Joseph Farrell & David Balan & Keith Brand & Brett Wendling, 2011. "Economics at the FTC: Hospital Mergers, Authorized Generic Drugs, and Consumer Credit Markets," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 39(4), pages 271-296, December.
    17. Christopher Garmon, 2017. "The accuracy of hospital merger screening methods," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 48(4), pages 1068-1102, December.
    18. Raval, Devesh & Rosenbaum, Ted & Wilson, Nathan E., 2021. "How do machine learning algorithms perform in predicting hospital choices? evidence from changing environments," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 78(C).
    19. Evan Starr, 2019. "Consider This: Training, Wages, and the Enforceability of Covenants Not to Compete," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 72(4), pages 783-817, August.
    20. Salomé Baslandze, 2022. "Entrepreneurship through Employee Mobility, Innovation, and Growth," FRB Atlanta Working Paper 2022-10, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
    21. Devesh Raval & Ted Rosenbaum & Steven A. Tenn, 2017. "A Semiparametric Discrete Choice Model: An Application To Hospital Mergers," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 55(4), pages 1919-1944, October.
    22. Manski, Charles F & Lerman, Steven R, 1977. "The Estimation of Choice Probabilities from Choice Based Samples," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 45(8), pages 1977-1988, November.
    23. Sonia Jaffe & E. Glen Weyl, 2013. "The First-Order Approach to Merger Analysis," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 5(4), pages 188-218, November.
    24. David J. Balan & Keith Brand, 2023. "Simulating Hospital Merger Simulations," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 71(1), pages 47-123, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Devesh Raval & Ted Rosenbaum & Nathan E. Wilson, 2022. "Using disaster‐induced closures to evaluate discrete choice models of hospital demand," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 53(3), pages 561-589, September.
    2. Raval, Devesh & Rosenbaum, Ted & Wilson, Nathan E., 2021. "How do machine learning algorithms perform in predicting hospital choices? evidence from changing environments," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 78(C).
    3. David J. Balan & Keith Brand, 2023. "Simulating Hospital Merger Simulations," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 71(1), pages 47-123, March.
    4. Martin Gaynor & Kate Ho & Robert J. Town, 2015. "The Industrial Organization of Health-Care Markets," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 53(2), pages 235-284, June.
    5. Michael Vita & Keith Brand & Miriam Larson-Koester & Nathan Petek & Charles Taragin & William Violette & Daniel H. Wood, 2022. "Economics at the FTC: Estimating Harm from Deception and Analyzing Mergers," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 61(4), pages 405-438, December.
    6. Devesh Raval & Ted Rosenbaum, 2021. "Why is Distance Important for Hospital Choice? Separating Home Bias From Transport Costs," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 69(2), pages 338-368, June.
    7. Christopher Conlon & Julie Holland Mortimer, 2021. "Empirical properties of diversion ratios," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 52(4), pages 693-726, December.
    8. Nathan H. Miller & Gloria Sheu, 2021. "Quantitative Methods for Evaluating the Unilateral Effects of Mergers," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 58(1), pages 143-177, February.
    9. Zack Cooper & Stuart V Craig & Martin Gaynor & John Van Reenen, 2019. "The Price Ain’t Right? Hospital Prices and Health Spending on the Privately Insured," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 134(1), pages 51-107.
    10. Devesh Raval & Ted Rosenbaum & Steven A. Tenn, 2017. "A Semiparametric Discrete Choice Model: An Application To Hospital Mergers," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 55(4), pages 1919-1944, October.
    11. Eric Barrette & Gautam Gowrisankaran & Robert Town, 2020. "Countervailing Market Power and Hospital Competition," NBER Working Papers 27005, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    12. Kate Ho & Robin S. Lee, 2017. "Insurer Competition in Health Care Markets," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 85, pages 379-417, March.
    13. Jéssica Dutra & Tarun Sabarwal, 2020. "Antitrust analysis with upward pricing pressure and cost efficiencies," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 15(1), pages 1-31, January.
    14. Kate Ho & Robin S. Lee, 2019. "Equilibrium Provider Networks: Bargaining and Exclusion in Health Care Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 109(2), pages 473-522, February.
    15. Stuart V. Craig & Matthew Grennan & Ashley Swanson, 2021. "Mergers and marginal costs: New evidence on hospital buyer power," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 52(1), pages 151-178, March.
    16. Samuel Kleiner & William White & Sean Lyons, 2015. "Market power and provider consolidation in physician markets," International Journal of Health Economics and Management, Springer, vol. 15(1), pages 99-126, March.
    17. Sonia Bhalotra & Letícia Nunes & Rudi Rocha, 2020. "Urgent Care Centers, Hospital Performance and Population Health," Working Papers 10, Instituto de Estudos para Políticas de Saúde.
    18. Bhalotra, Sonia & Nunes, Leticia & Rocha, Rudi, 2023. "Emergency Care Centers, Hospital Performance and Population Health," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 1456, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
    19. Slade, Margaret E., 2019. "Vertical Mergers: Ex Post Evidence and Ex Ante Evaluation Methods," Microeconomics.ca working papers margaret_e._slade-2019-10, Vancouver School of Economics, revised 25 Jun 2019.
    20. Dan Hanner & Ginger Zhe Jin & Marc Luppino & Ted Rosenbaum, 2016. "Economics at the FTC: Horizontal Mergers and Data Security," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 49(4), pages 613-631, December.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:revind:v:63:y:2023:i:4:d:10.1007_s11151-023-09930-0. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.