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Recent Developments at the CMA: 2016–2017

Author

Listed:
  • Chris Doyle

    (Competition and Markets Authority)

  • Alex Moore

    (Competition and Markets Authority)

  • Borbala Szathmary

    (Competition and Markets Authority)

  • Mike Walker

    (Competition and Markets Authority)

Abstract

We discuss three interesting cases that the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) has dealt with over the past year. First, we cover the ICE/Trayport vertical merger, which was prohibited by the CMA. Second, we discuss the CMA’s recent market investigation into the UK energy sector. The CMA arrived at the unexpected finding that markets with homogeneous products, multiple players and low entry barriers can still lead to significant competition concerns. Finally, we discuss the CMA’s work in relation to retail most favoured nation clauses, and include econometric results showing the impact of these clauses on platforms’ commission fees .

Suggested Citation

  • Chris Doyle & Alex Moore & Borbala Szathmary & Mike Walker, 2017. "Recent Developments at the CMA: 2016–2017," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 51(4), pages 423-449, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:revind:v:51:y:2017:i:4:d:10.1007_s11151-017-9594-8
    DOI: 10.1007/s11151-017-9594-8
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Justin P. Johnson, 2017. "The Agency Model and MFN Clauses," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 84(3), pages 1151-1185.
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