IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/kap/revind/v28y2006i2p109-128.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Auction Reforms for Effective Official Development Assistance

Author

Listed:
  • Atsushi Iimi

Abstract

Auctions, which are applicable to aid-related procurement systems, have been recently recognized as an important tool for improving economic efficiency. Using data on procurement auctions for Japanese official development assistance projects, the equilibrium bid function is estimated. The data reveals that a 1% increase in the number of bidders decreases the equilibrium bid by about 0.2%. This implies that strengthening competition at procurement auctions lowers contract prices and mitigates the heavy indebtedness of developing countries. Auctions are also instrumental in fostering local business environment and governance. For intensifying bidding competition, it is useful to introduce an electronic bidding system, encourage local firms to jointly bid, and relax excessive qualification requirements. Copyright Springer 2006

Suggested Citation

  • Atsushi Iimi, 2006. "Auction Reforms for Effective Official Development Assistance," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 28(2), pages 109-128, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:revind:v:28:y:2006:i:2:p:109-128
    DOI: 10.1007/s11151-006-0012-x
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11151-006-0012-x
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s11151-006-0012-x?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Auriol, Emmanuelle & Søreide, Tina, 2017. "An economic analysis of debarment," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 36-49.
    2. Michal Plaček & Martin Schmidt & František Ochrana & Michal Půček, 2017. "Do the Selected Characteristics of Public Tenders Affect the Likelihood of Filing Petitions with the Regulators of Public Tenders?," Prague Economic Papers, Prague University of Economics and Business, vol. 2017(3), pages 317-329.
    3. Antonio Estache & Atsushi Iimi, 2010. "Bidder Asymmetry in Infrastructure Procurement: Are There any Fringe Bidders?," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 36(2), pages 163-187, March.
    4. İlke Onur & Rasim Özcan & Bedri Taş, 2012. "Public Procurement Auctions and Competition in Turkey," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 40(3), pages 207-223, May.
    5. Barbosa, Klênio & Fiuza, Eduardo Pedral Sampaio, 2012. "Demand aggregation and credit risk effects in pooled procurement: evidence from the Brazilian public purchases of pharmaceuticals and medical supplies," Textos para discussão 299, FGV EESP - Escola de Economia de São Paulo, Fundação Getulio Vargas (Brazil).
    6. Estache, Antonio & Iimi, Atsushi, 2008. "Procurement efficiency for infrastructure development and financial needs reassessed," Policy Research Working Paper Series 4662, The World Bank.
    7. Martin Schmidt, 2015. "Price Determination in Public Procurement: A Game Theory Approach," European Financial and Accounting Journal, Prague University of Economics and Business, vol. 2015(1), pages 49-62.
    8. Antonio Estache & Atsushi Iimi, 2009. "Joint Bidding, Governance And Public Procurement Costs:A Case Of Road Projects," Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 80(3), pages 393-429, September.
    9. Jan Pavel & Emília Sičáková-Beblavá, 2012. "Postkontraktační chování veřejných zadavatelů na Slovensku [Post-Contractual Behaviour of Public Contracting Authorities in the Slovak Republic]," Politická ekonomie, Prague University of Economics and Business, vol. 2012(5), pages 635-648.
    10. Hiroshi Ohashi, 2009. "Effects of Transparency in Procurement Practices on Government Expenditure: A Case Study of Municipal Public Works," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 34(3), pages 267-285, May.
    11. Estache, Antonio & Iimi, Atsushi, 2011. "(Un)bundling infrastructure procurement: Evidence from water supply and sewage projects," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 104-114, June.
    12. Grega Matus & Orviska Marta & Nemec Juraj & Lawson Colin, 2019. "Factors Determining the Efficiency of Slovak Public Procurement," NISPAcee Journal of Public Administration and Policy, Sciendo, vol. 12(1), pages 43-68, June.
    13. Nakanishi, Yoshinobu, 2022. "Determinants of the number of bidders and win-reserve ratio in open competitive tendering: Relationship-specific investments and incomplete contracts," Japan and the World Economy, Elsevier, vol. 63(C).
    14. Antonio Estache & Atsushi Iimi, 2012. "Quality or Price? Evidence from ODA-Financed Public Procurement," Public Finance Review, , vol. 40(4), pages 435-469, July.
    15. Atsushi Iimi, 2013. "Testing Low-Balling Strategy in Rural Road Procurement," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 43(3), pages 243-261, November.
    16. Bedri Kamil Onur Tas, 2014. "How to Achieve Efficiency in Public Procurement Auctions," EcoMod2014 6728, EcoMod.
    17. Estache, Antonio & Iimi, Atsushi, 2009. "Auctions with endogenous participation and quality thresholds : evidence from ODA infrastructure procurement," Policy Research Working Paper Series 4853, The World Bank.
    18. Ochrana František & Hrnčířová Kristýna, 2015. "Does the Lowest Bid Price Evaluation Criterion Make for a More Efficient Public Procurement Selection Criterion? (Case of the Czech Republic)," NISPAcee Journal of Public Administration and Policy, Sciendo, vol. 8(1), pages 41-59, June.
    19. Jan Pavel & Emilia Sičáková-Beblavá, 2013. "Do E-Auctions Realy Improve the Efficiency of Public Procurement? The Case of the Slovak Municipalities," Prague Economic Papers, Prague University of Economics and Business, vol. 2013(1), pages 111-124.
    20. Qiao, Yu & Fricker, Jon D. & Labi, Samuel, 2019. "Effects of bundling policy on project cost under market uncertainty: A comparison across different highway project types," Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 606-625.
    21. Luis Mario García Lafuente & Asunción Mochón Sáez, 2022. "Competition effects in EU external aid supply tenders funded with the Pre-accession and Neighbourhood instruments," Empirica, Springer;Austrian Institute for Economic Research;Austrian Economic Association, vol. 49(2), pages 461-484, May.
    22. Ilke Onur & Bedri Kamil Onur Tas, 2019. "Optimal bidder participation in public procurement auctions," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 26(3), pages 595-617, June.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    competition effects; official development assistance; procurement auctions; C31; D44; H57; L31;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C31 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models; Multiple Variables - - - Cross-Sectional Models; Spatial Models; Treatment Effect Models; Quantile Regressions; Social Interaction Models
    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • H57 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Procurement
    • L31 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Nonprofit Institutions; NGOs; Social Entrepreneurship

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:revind:v:28:y:2006:i:2:p:109-128. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.