IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/kap/revind/v18y2001i2p175-182.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Regulation and Cost Inefficiency

Author

Listed:
  • Van Kolpin

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Van Kolpin, 2001. "Regulation and Cost Inefficiency," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 18(2), pages 175-182, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:revind:v:18:y:2001:i:2:p:175-182
    DOI: 10.1023/A:1007823231402
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1023/A:1007823231402
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1023/A:1007823231402?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Kenneth E. Train, 1991. "Optimal Regulation: The Economic Theory of Natural Monopoly," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262200848, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Halkos, George & Tzeremes, Nickolaos, 2011. "A conditional full frontier approach for investigating the Averch-Johnson effect," MPRA Paper 35491, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Haucap, Justus & Lange, Mirjam R. J. & Wey, Christian, 2012. "Nemo Omnibus Placet: Exzessive Regulierung und staatliche Willkür," DICE Ordnungspolitische Perspektiven 27, Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
    2. Klein, Michael, 1996. "Competition in network industries," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1591, The World Bank.
    3. Richard Tol, 2011. "Regulating knowledge monopolies: the case of the IPCC," Climatic Change, Springer, vol. 108(4), pages 827-839, October.
    4. Eto, J. & Stoft, S. & Kito, S., 1998. "DSM shareholder incentives: recent designs and economic theory," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 7(1), pages 47-62, March.
    5. Bauer, Johannes M., 2014. "Platforms, systems competition, and innovation: Reassessing the foundations of communications policy," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 38(8), pages 662-673.
    6. Michael Peneder, 1996. "Wettbewerb und Regulierung netzgebundener Infrastrukturleistungen: Telekommunikation, Energieversorgung und Schienenverkehr," Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft - WuG, Kammer für Arbeiter und Angestellte für Wien, Abteilung Wirtschaftswissenschaft und Statistik, vol. 22(2), pages 213-229.
    7. Alexandros M. Goulielmos, 2018. "“After End-2008 Structural Changes in Containership Market” and Their Impact on Industry’s Policy," IJFS, MDPI, vol. 6(4), pages 1-21, November.
    8. Sven Heidenreich & Katrin Talke, 2012. "Tarifwahl-Anomalien bei optionalen Mobilfunktarifen — Eine Analyse der Ursachen von Flatrate-Präferenz und Flatrate-Bias," Schmalenbach Journal of Business Research, Springer, vol. 64(3), pages 280-307, May.
    9. Lindemann, Henrik, 2015. "Regulatory Objectives and the Intensity of Unbundling in Electricity Markets," Hannover Economic Papers (HEP) dp-544, Leibniz Universität Hannover, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät.
    10. Saplacan, Roxana, 2008. "Competition in electricity distribution," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 16(4), pages 231-237, December.
    11. Schaefers, Tobias & Leban, Marina & Vogt, Florian, 2022. "On-demand features: Consumer reactions to tangibility and pricing structure," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 139(C), pages 751-761.
    12. Gatta, Valerio & Marcucci, Edoardo, 2007. "Quality and public transport service contracts," European Transport \ Trasporti Europei, ISTIEE, Institute for the Study of Transport within the European Economic Integration, issue 36, pages 92-106.
    13. Barbara Praetorius, 1996. "Nachfrageseitiges Marktversagen auf dem Energiemarkt: Empirische Evidenz, theoretische Aspekte, politische Folgerungen," Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung / Quarterly Journal of Economic Research, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research, vol. 65(2), pages 143-155.
    14. Button, Kenneth & McDougall, Glen, 2006. "Institutional and structure changes in air navigation service-providing organizations," Journal of Air Transport Management, Elsevier, vol. 12(5), pages 236-252.
    15. Nongluk Buranabunyut & James Peoples, 2012. "An empirical analysis of incentive regulation and the allocation of inputs in the US telecommunications industry," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 41(2), pages 181-200, April.
    16. Janić, Milan, 1997. "Liberalisation of European aviation: analysis and modelling of the airline behaviour," Journal of Air Transport Management, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 167-180.
    17. Robert Mysicka & Marty McKendry, 2013. "Beer, Butter, and Barristers: How Canadian Governments Put Cartels before Consumers," C.D. Howe Institute Commentary, C.D. Howe Institute, issue 382, May.
    18. Koji Miyawaki & Yasuhiro Omori & Akira Hibiki, 2018. "A discrete/continuous choice model on a nonconvex budget set," Econometric Reviews, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 37(2), pages 89-113, February.
    19. Guy Meunier & Jean-Pierre Ponssard & Francisco Ruiz-Aliseda, 2015. "Antitrust versus industrial policies, entry and welfare," Working Papers 2015-01, Alimentation et Sciences Sociales.
    20. Wang, Shuaian & Meng, Qiang & Liu, Zhiyuan, 2013. "Fundamental properties of volume–capacity ratio of a private toll road in general networks," Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, Elsevier, vol. 47(C), pages 77-86.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Inefficiency; regulation;

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:revind:v:18:y:2001:i:2:p:175-182. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.