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Judicial engagement in classical Liberal public governance: a response and extension to Aligica, Boettke, and Tarko

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  • Jennifer Huddleston

    (George Mason University)

Abstract

This work considers the role that the judiciary and administrative law doctrines, like judicial deference, would have within the ideal classical liberal administrative state theorized by (Aligica PD, Boettke P, Tarko V, Public governance and the classical-Liberal perspective. Oxford University Press, New York, 2019) in their book Public Governance and the Classical-Liberal Perspective. I argue that even in an environment in which the administrative state is overhauled, that merely changing the incentives and institutions of public administration would not resolve all of the concerns regarding administrative agencies’ behavior nor the courts’ response to their actions. Within this theorized classically liberal system of public administration, there still exists the potential for administrative actions to undermine the proper separation of powers and checks and balances. Such issues could ultimately allow even this more ideal system to devolve into unchecked state power. Therefore, as a check on this potential, the judiciary would still play a necessary within (Aligica PD, Boettke P, Tarko V, Public governance and the classical-Liberal perspective. Oxford University Press, New York, 2019) classical liberal administrative state. To maximize personal freedom and liberty, I argue such a role would also require the courts to reform their current overly deferential stance regarding delegation of authority to administrative agencies, act as an impartial venue of redress for those harmed by the administrative state, and resolve ambiguous delegations of power.

Suggested Citation

  • Jennifer Huddleston, 2021. "Judicial engagement in classical Liberal public governance: a response and extension to Aligica, Boettke, and Tarko," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer;Society for the Development of Austrian Economics, vol. 34(3), pages 361-371, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:revaec:v:34:y:2021:i:3:d:10.1007_s11138-019-00490-9
    DOI: 10.1007/s11138-019-00490-9
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Dicey, Albert Venn, 1915. "Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution," History of Economic Thought Books, McMaster University Archive for the History of Economic Thought, edition 8, number dicey1915.
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