IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/kap/regeco/v50y2016i1d10.1007_s11149-016-9305-7.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Weak versus strong net neutrality: correction and clarification

Author

Listed:
  • Joshua S. Gans

    (University of Toronto
    NBER)

  • Michael L. Katz

    (Haas School of Business)

Abstract

We correct and clarify the results of Gans (J Regul Econ 47:183–200, 2015) regarding the effects of net neutrality regulation on equilibrium outcomes in settings where a content provider sells its services to consumers for a fee. We examine both pricing and investment effects. We extend the earlier paper’s result that weak forms of net neutrality are ineffective and also show that even a strong form of net neutrality may be ineffective. In addition, we demonstrate that, when strong net neutrality does affect the equilibrium outcome, it may harm efficiency by distorting both ISP and content provider investment and service-quality choices.

Suggested Citation

  • Joshua S. Gans & Michael L. Katz, 2016. "Weak versus strong net neutrality: correction and clarification," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 50(1), pages 99-110, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:regeco:v:50:y:2016:i:1:d:10.1007_s11149-016-9305-7
    DOI: 10.1007/s11149-016-9305-7
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11149-016-9305-7
    File Function: Abstract
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s11149-016-9305-7?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Shane Greenstein & Martin Peitz & Tommaso Valletti, 2016. "Net Neutrality: A Fast Lane to Understanding the Trade-Offs," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 30(2), pages 127-150, Spring.
    2. Joshua Gans, 2015. "Weak versus strong net neutrality," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 47(2), pages 183-200, April.
    3. Gans Joshua S & King Stephen P, 2003. "The Neutrality of Interchange Fees in Payment Systems," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 3(1), pages 1-18, January.
    4. Hermalin, Benjamin E. & Katz, Michael L., 2007. "The economics of product-line restrictions with an application to the network neutrality debate," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 215-248, June.
    5. A. Michael Spence, 1975. "Monopoly, Quality, and Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 6(2), pages 417-429, Autumn.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Vogelsang, Ingo, 2019. "Has Europe missed the endgame of telecommunications policy?," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 1-10.
    2. Edmond Baranes & Cuong Hung Vuong, 2020. "Investment in Quality Upgrade and Regulation of the Internet," CESifo Working Paper Series 8074, CESifo.
    3. Edmond Baranes & Cuong Hung Vuong, 2022. "Investment in quality upgrade and regulation of the internet," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 61(1), pages 1-31, February.
    4. Koning, Kendall J. & Yankelevich, Aleksandr, 2018. "From internet “Openness” to “Freedom”: How far has the net neutrality pendulum swung?," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 37-45.
    5. Broos, Sébastien & Gautier, Axel, 2017. "The exclusion of competing one-way essential complements: Implications for net neutrality," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 52(C), pages 358-392.
    6. Jeitschko, Thomas D. & Kim, Soo Jin & Yankelevich, Aleksandr, 2021. "Zero-Rating and Vertical Content Foreclosure," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 55(C).
    7. Vogelsang Ingo, 2018. "Net Neutrality Regulation: Much Ado about Nothing?," Review of Network Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 17(3), pages 225-243, September.
    8. Jamison Mark A., 2018. "Net Neutrality Policies and Regulation in the United States," Review of Network Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 17(3), pages 151-173, September.
    9. Michael L. Katz, 2017. "Wither U.S. Net Neutrality Regulation?," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 50(4), pages 441-468, June.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Joshua S. Gans & Michael L. Katz, 2016. "Net Neutrality, Pricing Instruments and Incentives," NBER Working Papers 22040, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Reggiani, Carlo & Valletti, Tommaso, 2016. "Net neutrality and innovation at the core and at the edge," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 45(C), pages 16-27.
    3. Michael L. Katz, 2017. "Wither U.S. Net Neutrality Regulation?," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 50(4), pages 441-468, June.
    4. Armando J. Garcia Pires, 2021. "Net neutrality and content provision," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 89(6), pages 569-593, December.
    5. Jamison Mark A., 2018. "Net Neutrality Policies and Regulation in the United States," Review of Network Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 17(3), pages 151-173, September.
    6. Saruta, Fuyuki, 2021. "Effects of Vertical Integration on Internet Service Providers' Zero-rating Choice," MPRA Paper 110288, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Koning, Kendall J. & Yankelevich, Aleksandr, 2018. "From internet “Openness” to “Freedom”: How far has the net neutrality pendulum swung?," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 37-45.
    8. Vogelsang Ingo, 2018. "Net Neutrality Regulation: Much Ado about Nothing?," Review of Network Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 17(3), pages 225-243, September.
    9. Reisinger, Markus & Zenger, Hans, 2019. "Interchange fee regulation and service investments," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 66(C), pages 40-77.
    10. Broos, Sébastien & Gautier, Axel, 2017. "The exclusion of competing one-way essential complements: Implications for net neutrality," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 52(C), pages 358-392.
    11. Bourguignon, Hélène & Gomes, Renato & Tirole, Jean, 2019. "Shrouded transaction costs: must-take cards, discounts and surcharges," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 63(C), pages 99-144.
    12. Nicholas Economides & Benjamin E. Hermalin, 2015. "The strategic use of download limits by a monopoly platform," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 46(2), pages 297-327, June.
    13. Lorenzon, Emmanuel, 2022. "Zero-rating, content quality, and network capacity," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 58(C).
    14. Edmond Baranes & Cuong Hung Vuong, 2020. "Investment in Quality Upgrade and Regulation of the Internet," CESifo Working Paper Series 8074, CESifo.
    15. Stocker Volker & Knieps Guenter, 2018. "Network Neutrality Through the Lens of Network Economics," Review of Network Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 17(3), pages 115-150, September.
    16. Baake, Pio & Sudaric, Slobodan, 2019. "Net neutrality and CDN intermediation," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 46(C), pages 55-67.
    17. Michael L. Katz, 2019. "Platform economics and antitrust enforcement: A little knowledge is a dangerous thing," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(1), pages 138-152, January.
    18. Gautier, Axel & Somogyi, Robert, 2020. "Prioritization vs zero-rating: Discrimination on the internet," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 73(C).
    19. Jullien, Bruno & Sand-Zantman, Wilfried, 2018. "Internet regulation, two-sided pricing, and sponsored data," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 31-62.
    20. Kim Soo Jin, 2020. "Direct Interconnection and Investment Incentives for Content Quality," Review of Network Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 18(3), pages 169-204, September.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Regulation; Net neutrality; Internet service providers; Content providers; Infrastructure investment;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
    • D4 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design
    • L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • C63 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Computational Techniques
    • D42 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Monopoly
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:regeco:v:50:y:2016:i:1:d:10.1007_s11149-016-9305-7. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.