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Auctions and Regulation: Reengineering of Regulatory Mechanisms

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  • Salant, David

Abstract

The FCC auctions, beginning in July 1994, were a watershed event in what may be best called reengineering regulation. It was the first time a new market mechanism, in the form of an auction, had been developed especially to replace traditional administrative procedures for regulating access to a natural resource. The spectrum auctions, and the soon to follow trading in SO2 emission rights were the two initial instances in which game theory, and more specifically auction theory, played an essential role in the design of an market-based allocation process. The FCC developed a novel auction format for the spectrum auctions. The replacing of administrative regulatory processes with market mechanisms is a major innovation in regulation, or perhaps more accurately, deregulation. Copyright 2000 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal Journal of Regulatory Economics.

Volume (Year): 17 (2000)
Issue (Month): 3 (May)
Pages: 195-204

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Handle: RePEc:kap:regeco:v:17:y:2000:i:3:p:195-204

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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100298

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Cited by:
  1. Klemperer, Paul, 2000. "What Really Matters in Auction Design," CEPR Discussion Papers 2581, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  2. Porter, David & Rassenti, Stephen & Shobe, William & Smith, Vernon & Winn, Abel, 2009. "The design, testing and implementation of Virginia's NOx allowance auction," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 69(2), pages 190-200, February.
  3. Lesser, Jonathan A. & Su, Xuejuan, 2008. "Design of an economically efficient feed-in tariff structure for renewable energy development," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 36(3), pages 981-990, March.
  4. Affuso, Luisa, 2003. "Auctions of rail capacity?," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 11(1), pages 43-46, March.

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