Additional Incumbent Spending Really Can Harm (at Least Some) Incumbents: An Analysis of Vote Share Maximization
AbstractThe literature on the effects of campaign expenditures on electoral outcomes implicitly suggests that incumbent spending cannot have a negative marginal impact on the incumbent's vote share. Indeed, that literature has spent a great deal of effort finding positive and significant effects of incumbent spending. This paper shows that there are circumstances under which theory predicts zero and even negative impacts of incumbent spending. Estimating equations derived from the theory provide strong support for the base model, though only weak support for the extensions which predict nonpositive marginal products for incumbents. Copyright 1998 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.
Volume (Year): 95 (1998)
Issue (Month): 1-2 (April)
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100332
Other versions of this item:
- Dennis Coates, 1998. "Additional incumbent spending really can harm (at least some) incumbents: An analysis of vote share maximization," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 95(1), pages 63-87, April.
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- Thomas Stratmann, 2003. "Tainted Money? Contribution Limits and the Effectiveness of Campaign Spending," CESifo Working Paper Series 1044, CESifo Group Munich.
- Enrique García Viñuela & Joaquín Artés Caselles, 2008. "Reforming campaign finance in the nineties: a case study of Spain," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 25(3), pages 177-190, June.
- Filip Palda, 2002. "Campaign Finance: An Introduction to the Field," Public Economics 0209005, EconWPA.
- Paulo Jorge Reis Mourao, 2012. "The Weber-Fechner Law And Public Expenditures Impact To The Win-Margins At Parliamentary Elections," Prague Economic Papers, University of Economics, Prague, vol. 2012(3), pages 291-308.
- Thomas Stratmann, 2009. "How prices matter in politics: the returns to campaign advertising," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 140(3), pages 357-377, September.
- Thomas Stratmann, 2006. "Contribution limits and the effectiveness of campaign spending," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 129(3), pages 461-474, December.
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