The purpose of the paper is to advocate that constitutions should be established through a contractarian process, rather than through conventions. To achieve it, they are studied from the perspective of the concept of common knowledge. The authors refer to its political philosophy and game theory dimensions. The making of common knowledge relates to communication and induction problems. The argument is applied to European constitutional integration with a particular focus on administrative law. Copyright 1995 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
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Article provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.
Volume (Year): 85 (1995) Issue (Month): 1-2 (October) Pages: 173-88 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
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