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The Making of the French Civil Code: An Economic Interpretation

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  • Jean-Michel Josselin

    ()

  • Alain Marciano

    ()

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1023/A:1020724812652
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal European Journal of Law and Economics.

Volume (Year): 14 (2002)
Issue (Month): 3 (November)
Pages: 193-203

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Handle: RePEc:kap:ejlwec:v:14:y:2002:i:3:p:193-203

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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100264

Related research

Keywords: codification; contractualism; spontaneous order; monopoly; competition; common knowledge;

References

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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  1. Witt, Ulrich, 1998. "Imagination and leadership - The neglected dimension of an evolutionary theory of the firm," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 35(2), pages 161-177, April.
  2. Witt, Ulrich, 1999. " Do Entrepreneurs Need Firms? A Contribution to a Missing Chapter in Austrian Economics," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer, vol. 11(1-2), pages 99-109.
  3. H. Peyton Young, 1996. "The Economics of Convention," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 10(2), pages 105-122, Spring.
  4. Greif, Avner, 1989. "Reputation and Coalitions in Medieval Trade: Evidence on the Maghribi Traders," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 49(04), pages 857-882, December.
  5. Benson, B.L., 1996. "The Evolution of Commercial Law," Working Papers 1996_09_04, Department of Economics, Florida State University.
  6. Benson Bruce L., 2000. "Jurisdictional Choice in International Trade: Implications for Lex Cybernatoria," Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 1-32, March.
  7. Ernst Fehr & Simon Gaechter, 2000. "Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocity," CESifo Working Paper Series 336, CESifo Group Munich.
  8. Oates, Wallace E, 1985. "Searching for Leviathan: An Empirical Study," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(4), pages 748-57, September.
  9. Josselin, Jean-Michel & Marciano, Alain, 1999. "Unitary states and peripheral regions: a model of heterogeneous spatial clubs1," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(4), pages 501-511, December.
  10. Frey, Bruno S, 1997. "A Constitution for Knaves Crowds Out Civic Virtues," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 107(443), pages 1043-53, July.
  11. Jãœrgen Backhaus, 1999. "The German Civil Code of 1896: An Economic Interpretation," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 7(1), pages 5-15, January.
  12. Blum, U. & Dudley, L., 1990. "A Spatial Model Of The State," Cahiers de recherche 9030, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
  13. Josselin, Jean-Michel & Marciano, Alain, 1995. " Constitutionalism and Common Knowledge: Assessment and Application to a Future European Constitution," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 85(1-2), pages 173-88, October.
  14. Benson, Bruce L, 1999. " An Economic Theory of the Evolution of Governance and the Emergence of the State," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer, vol. 12(2), pages 131-60, November.
  15. JEAN-MICHEL Josselin & ALAIN Marciano, 1997. "The Paradox of Leviathan: How to Develop and Contain the Future European State?," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 4(1), pages 5-22, January.
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Cited by:
  1. Benito Arruñada & Veneta Andonova, 2004. "Market institutions and judicial rulemaking," Economics Working Papers 801, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.

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